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Opportunities for Obtaining and Using Litigation
Reserves and Disclosures
MATrHEW J. BARRETt*
In late 1975, the accounting and legalprofessions reached an accord that led to
three new professional standards: (1) a new financial accounting rule for
contingencies, (2) an auditing standard addressing the requirement that an
auditor obtain evidence about an audit client's contingent liabilities to
determine whether the client has properly treated those items in its financial
statements, and (3) the American Bar Association's Statement of Policy
Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors'Requestsfor Information under that
auditing standard. The Commentary that accompanied the Statement of Policy
explicitly stated that the organized bar's expectation that communications
between lawyers and auditors in accordance with the Statement of Policy would
not prove prejudicialto clients engaged in orfacing adversaryproceedings.If
developments occurred to negate that expectation, the Statement of Policy
recognized that the American Bar Association may need to review and revise
both the Statement of Policy and the accord
Using several recently settled cases as examples, this article shows that existing
law often allows litigation opponents access to significant information about the
evaluations of an enterprise's management, auditor, and attorneys about the
enterprise'sexposure in the litigation,potentially evidenced by amounts that the
enterprise has already accrued as an expense under the financial accounting
rules. Since the accord and the Statement of Policy, three important
developments have significantly changed the then-present legal landscape: the
enhanced federal securities law disclosures in the Management's Discussion
and Analysis requirements, the Supreme Court's 1984 opinion in United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., and the "economic performance" requirement that the
Tax Reform Act of 1984 added to § 461(h) of the Internal Revenue Code. Given
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. B.B.A. 1982; J.D. 1985, University of
Notre Dame. C.P.A. (inactive) 1987, Ohio. The author gratefully acknowledges helpful
suggestions from Stephen M. Bainbridge, Alan Gunn, David R. Herwitz, Allan J. Samansky,
Thomas L. Shaffer, Stanley Siegel, Jay H. Tidmarsh, his colleagues who participated in a
faculty colloquium on this topic at the Notre Dame Law School, and various participants in a
similar presentation to the Accountancy Advisory Board of the Mendoza College of Business
at the University of Notre Dame, and the research assistance of Shannon Benbow, Brian
Neach, and Gabe Tsui. Significant sections of this article are adapted from DAVID R. HERWrrz
& MATrHEw J. BARREnt, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR LAwYERs (3d ed. 2001).
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew J. Barrett.

1018

OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1017

those developments, the article calls for a review of the accord and the
Statement of Policy. Pending such review, this article also proposesa new rule
of evidence that, similarto Rule 411 of the FederalRules of Evidence on liability
insurance, would allow the discovery of information about litigation reserves,
but generally bar such informationfrom admission into evidence at trial.
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I. INTRODUCrION

On January 12, 1995, shortly after filing bankruptcy petitions during the
previous month, Orange County, California ("Orange County"), and various
funds that the Orange County Treasurer-Tax Collector controlled for
approximately 200 other municipal entities (the "Pools"), filed a lawsuit seeking
more than $2 billion in damages from Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. and certain
subsidiaries (collectively, "Merrill Lynch"). The lawsuit asserted both state and
federal claims and alleged that Merrill Lynch failed to warn county officials
about the riskiness and alleged unlawfulness of the derivatives-based investment
scheme that ultimately led to the nation's largest municipal bankruptcy.' More
than three years later, on June 2, 1998, Orange County and Merrill Lynch
announced a more than $400 million settlement to end the litigation. 2 In its press
release, Merrill Lynch "announced that it was fully reserved for the settlement
and 'that the payment will have no financial impact on earnings reported in the
3
1998 second quarter or subsequent quarters."'
What does that press release tell us? That announcement indicates that
sometime before April 1, 1998, the start of Merrill Lynch's second quarter, the
company had expensed more than $400 million related to the litigation against
earnings and had either recorded liabilities, written off assets, or some
combination of both on its balance sheet to the tune of that same $400 millionplus.4 Although a diligent review of Merrill Lynch's financial statements for, and
1 County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Ch. 11 Case No. SA 94-22272JR, Adv. No.
CV-95-0037-GLT (Bankr. C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 12,1995).

2 In addition to agreeing to a $400 million payment, Merrill Lynch reportedly agreed to
return some $20 million in excess collateral for distribution to the Pools and to pay $17.1
million to the Irvine Ranch Water District to settle a related suit. Andy Pasztor et al., Merrill
Lynch to Pay $437.1 Million to Resolve Claims by Orange County, WAIL ST. J., June 3, 1998,
at A3; see also MerrillLynch to Pay $400 Million to Settle Orange County BankruptcySuit, 30
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 846 (1998).

3 MerrillLynch to Pay $400 Million to Settle Orange County Bankruptcy Suit, supra note
2; see also Pasztor et al., supra note 2.
4 Such expenses would reduce the company's profit or loss for the particular accounting
period. During litigation, some enterprises record estimated losses for financial accounting
purposes and also establish or increase a corresponding liability, sometimes described as a
"reserve" or "provision." Accountants use the terms "reserve" and "provision" to refer to
anticipated liabilities when uncertainty exists about the amount or timing of the transfer of the
economic benefits that the obligation's payment or satisfaction will entail. As such, "litigation
reserve," "litigation contingency reserve," "reserve for litigation," and similar terms all refer to
amounts arising from an expected loss or potential settlement related to anticipated or pending
litigation that an enterprise has treated as an expense, but has not yet paid. Because the
enterprise has not paid the corresponding obligation, the enterprise's balance sheet will treat the
estimated amount owed as a liability.
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Several other points about such "accrued expenses" merit mention at this time. First, the
term "accrued expenses" refers to expenses that an enterprise has subtracted from income, but
not yet paid. Some accountants have suggested that in any case in which an enterprise must
estimate the amount of an expense, the enterprise should use a different name for any
corresponding liability created. For this reason, some enterprises use the term "Estimated
Liability" to describe the obligation arising from these accrued expenses. Thus, an enterprise
might call the liability created when accruing an expense related to anticipated or pending
litigation "Estimated Liability for Litigation" rather than "Litigation Liability Payable" or
"Accrued Litigation Costs Payable." Such nomenclature presumably allows a reader to separate
such liabilities from others that qualify as unconditional, whether or not due yet, and certain in
amount. No uniform practice exists on this matter, however, and many enterprises lump all
their liabilities arising from accrued expenses under a single heading like "Accrued Liabilities,"
"Other Current Liabilities," or "Other Liabilities" on their balance sheets.
Because lawyers will often encounter various terminology describing accrued liabilities,
some history about this vocabulary also warrants discussion. At one time, accountants used the
term "reserve," as in "Reserve for Litigation Expense," to signify estimated or conditional
liabilities. Because the term connotes setting something aside, presumably assets, to satisfy the
underlying liability, the term can easily mislead an unsophisticated reader.
Any time an enterprise accrues an expense, the accrual lowers net income for the
accounting period, which in turn reduces retained earnings, and net assets, at the end of the
period. As a result, any such accrual adversely affects the amount that an enterprise could
lawfully distribute to its owners. An enterprise, however, can also set aside cash or other liquid
assets and specifically earmark those assets for a particular purpose, such as discharging an
obligation arising from litigation or paying for a new plant. For example, the enterprise might
establish a formal escrow arrangement or, less formally, simply open a special bank account.
The term "reserve," unfortunately, suggests that the enterprise has established some such
arrangement. In fact, however, calling the liability a "reserve" means nothing more than that the
enterprise created a liability and estimated the amount in conjunction with accruing an expense.
Loose terminology has often accompanied the term "reserve" in related contexts. Judicial
opinions, for example, sometimes refer to "deducting the reserve from income" or "reserves
out of income." Presumably, this language seeks to express the fact that the enterprise created a
reserve account in conjunction with a charge against income in exactly the same amount. Such
phrases, however, can confuse a reader, because the term "reserve" describes a liability which
appears on the balance sheet, and liabilities themselves do not affect the determination of net
income.
Given these concerns, Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. I urged that the accounting
profession narrowly confine the word "reserve" and recommended that enterprises discontinue
the term's use to describe the liability accompanying an accrued expense. REVIEW AND
RgsUMl, Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 1, 60 (American Inst. of Accountants 1953).
In fact, however, the term "reserve" still appears in accounting and legal materials. A 2000
survey by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") of accounting
practices followed in 600 annual reports shows that the term "reserve" continues to appear
occasionally in financial statements to describe accruals for estimated expenses, insurance,

environmental costs, and other liabilities. AM. INST. OF
ACCOUNTING TRENDS & TECHNIQUES 299 (54th ed. 2000).

CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,

To complicate matters further, the term "reserve" can also refer to a so-called "contra-asset
account," such as "Reserve for Doubtful Accounts," that an enterprise might use to write-down
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as of the end of, the quarterly and annual periods published after the lawsuit's
filing and before the settlement does not reveal either the previously expensed
amounts or any related liabilities or asset write-downs, 5 a careful reading of the
an asset, such as an uncollectible accounts receivable. As the name suggests, a contra-asset
account records reductions in a particular asset account, such as Accounts Receivable,
separately from the relevant asset account. Paralleling the normal practice of crediting an
estimated liability account when an enterprise, such as Merrill Lynch, accrues an expense or
loss prior to payment, when writing down an asset, such as an accounts receivable from Orange
County or the Pools that Merrill Lynch may have agreed not to collect to settle the litigation,
the enterprise could correspondingly credit an account, which we can consider for the moment
as an estimated liability, to reflect the write-down. Two important differences, however,
distinguish such an account from other estimated liability accounts. First, this
estimated-liability-type account does not represent a liability to pay money or perform services,
but rather represents the fact that the business will not actually collect some money which, by
recording various accounts receivable, the enterprise projected it would receive. Second, the
account created to reflect such uncollectible accounts often appears on the balance sheet as an
offset to accounts receivable, rather than separately as a liability, to give a more accurate picture
of how much cash the enterprise actually expects to obtain from the receivables. Perhaps for
these reasons, enterprises usually do not use an "Estimated Liability" caption for such an
account. In modem accounting practice, most enterprises commonly call the account something
like "Allowance for Doubtful Accounts" or "Allowance." Id.at 200. Other enterprises may use
other names, such as "Reserve for Uncollectible Accounts" or "Reserve for Bad Debts," for
such a contra-asset account. In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
uses the term "reserve" in this same context. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 210.12-09 (2002) (valuation
and qualifying accounts and reserves not included in specific schedules). The fact that Merrill
Lynch's 1997 and 1996 Form 10-Ks do not contain such a listing suggests that the company
treated the entire $400 million previously expensed as an accrued liability.
One final possibility also requires mention. Merrill Lynch may have purchased insurance
to protect the company against losses from its employees' errors and omissions. If insurance
covered the settlement, either by paying the settlement directly or reimbursing Merrill Lynch
for amounts the company incurred to settle the litigation, the settlement also would not have
affected current or future earnings. If Merrill Lynch had carried insurance against such losses,
either the press release announcing the settlement or the company's public filings with the SEC
presumably would have mentioned such insurance.
5 Beginning with Merrill Lynch's consolidated financial statements for the fiscal year
ending December 30, 1994, which describes the filing of the Orange County litigation as a
subsequent event in the note captioned "Commitments and Contingencies," the only specific
reference to that litigation in the financial statements themselves occurs in the "Notes to
Consolidated Financial Statements." MERRILL LYNCH & Co., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO
STOCKHOLDERS 44-45 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 MERRILL LYNCH ANNUAL REPORT], included
as Exhibit 13 to MERRiL LYNCH & CO., FORM 10-K, ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECnON
13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURrrES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (for the fiscal year ended Dec. 30,
1994) (filed Mar. 28, 1995) [hereinafter 1994 MERRHIL LYNCH FORM 10-K]. Through the
consolidated financial statements for the fiscal year ending December 26, 1997, the notes on
"Commitments and Contingencies" update the status of the litigation and conclude with almost
identical statements to the effect:
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company's public filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")

offers some important clues into Merrill Lynch's accounting practices. Repeating
amounts from the financial statements, the supplemental tables for "Non-Interest
Expenses" in the Management's Discussion and Analysis ("MD&A") section of
Merrill Lynch's Form 10-Ks for the fiscal years ended December 27, 1996 and
December 26, 1997, which the company filed with the SEC on March 21, 1997

and March 3, 1998, respectively, reveal that other non-interest expenses,
excluding compensation and benefits, increased from $697 million in fiscal 1995
to $859 million in fiscal 1996 and to $1,136 million in fiscal 1997.6 In the
accompanying textual discussion, the MD&A for fiscal 1997 remarkably
comments: "Other expenses increased 32% from 1996 due to increases in
provisions for various business activities and legal matters, and higher office and
postage costs." 7 That textual discussion also contains another statement that
previously appeared in the MD&A for fiscal 1996: "Other expenses rose 23%
due in part to provisions related to various business activities and goodwill
8
amortization."
Although the ultimate outcome of [the Orange County litigation] cannot be ascertained at
this time and the results of legal proceedings cannot be predicted with certainty, it is the
opinion of management that the resolution of these matters will not have a material
adverse effect on the Consolidated Financial Statements of Merrill Lynch contained
herein.
MERRILL LYNCH & CO., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT TO STOCKHOLDERS 56 (1998) [hereinafter
1997 MERRILL LYNCH ANNUAL REPORT] (note 7), incorporated by reference in MERRILL
LYNCH & CO., FORM 10-K, ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (for the fiscal year ended Dec. 26, 1997) (filed Mar. 5,
1998) [hereinafter 1997 MERRELL LYNCH FORM 10-K]; MERRILL LYNCH & CO., 1996 ANNUAL
REPORT TO STOCKHOLDERS 59 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 MERRILL LYNCH ANNUAL REPORT]

(note 7), included as Exhibit 13 to MERRILL LYNCH & CO., FORM 10-K, ANNUAL REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (for the fiscal

year ended Dec. 27, 1996) (filed Mar. 21, 1997) [hereinafter 1996 MERRILL LYNCH FORM 10K]; MERRILL LYNCH & CO., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT TO STOCKHOLDERS 63--64 (1996) (note
17), included as Exhibit 13 to MERRILL LYNCH & CO., FORM 10-K, ANNUAL REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURrrIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (for the fiscal
year ended Dec. 29, 1995) (filed Mar. 22, 1996); 1994 MERRILL LYNCH ANNUAL REPORT,
supra,at 45 (notes not numbered and different capitalization).
6 1997 MERRIL LYNCH FORM 10-K, supra note 5, at 198-99; 1996 MERRILL LYNCH
FORM 10-K, supra note 5, at 18-19 (referencing the MD&A discussion in the 1996 MERRILL
LYNCH ANNUAL REPORT). Please notice that this information appears on pages 198-99 of the
267 page Form 10-K for fiscal 1996 and pages 18-19 of the 165 page Form 10-K for fiscal
1997.
7 1997 MERRILL LYNCH FORM 10-K, supra note 5,at 18.
8 Id. at 19; see also 1996 MERRILL LYNCH FORM 10-K, supra note 5, at 199. Incidentally,
the 1996 Merrill Lynch Form 10-K does not mention any "provisions related to various
business activities" during the discussion detailing non-interest expenses for fiscal 1995. Id.
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As counsel for Orange County, would you find this information helpful?
Assuming that Merrill Lynch had previously expensed amounts related to its
expected loss in the litigation against earnings under the applicable financial
accounting rules, collectively say $400 million over various accounting periods
after Orange County and the Pools filed the underlying lawsuit, and included a
corresponding $400 million liability, sometimes called a "litigation reserve" or a
"litigation contingency reserve," 9 on its March 31, 1998 balance sheet, could
Orange County extract information about such accruals during discovery, either
from Merrill Lynch or from Deloitte & Touche LLP, the company's auditor?
Would the total amount that Merrill Lynch had previously expensed become a de
facto "floor" below which Orange County would refuse to drop in any settlement
negotiations? If Merrill Lynch expensed additional amounts as additional losses
related to the lawsuit as the litigation progressed, could Orange County obtain
information about any such adjustments? Would any such accrual constitute an
admission against interest?10
Although counsel for both Orange County and Merrill Lynch have quite
understandably declined to discuss the specifics of the litigation, the former
specifically mentioning a confidentiality agreement, this article opines that
counsel for Orange County could have potentially used the disclosures in the
MD&A to try to gather additional information about the exact amount of the
accrued liability on Merrill Lynch's books, certainly before agreeing to any
settlement and perhaps for use at trial as an admission against interest. I I
How could counsel for Orange County use these disclosures to gather
additional information, financial or other, about the underlying case? What other
potential sources of information about litigation reserves might counsel for
Orange County have sought to obtain during the discovery process? This article
suggests that counsel for Orange County might have scheduled depositions or
submitted interrogatories and requested the production of various documents to
obtain a detailed listing of each item above a certain figure, say $5 million,
included in the $697 million, $859 million, and $1,136 million groupings. In the
context of this same litigation between Orange County and Merrill Lynch, this
article describes several other sources of accounting-related information about
litigation reserves or disclosures that plaintiffs' attorneys, in particular, may find
useful.

9 For an explanation regarding the terms "litigation reserve" and "litigation contingency
reserve," see supra note 4.
10 See FED. R. EVlD. 801(d)(2)(A).

I1If Merrill Lynch and Orange County had not settled the underlying litigation, concern
about the effect my research might have had on that litigation would have made me reluctant to
use this example as a case study. For this same reason, this article does not knowingly offer any
examples involving currently pending litigation.
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Putting aside the litigation between Orange County and Merrill Lynch,
numerous other recent examples illustrate this opportunity for obtaining and
using accounting-related information about an underlying lawsuit in litigation. In
similar fashion to the Orange County settlement, and again without admitting any
wrongdoing, Merrill Lynch agreed in May 2000 to pay Sumitomo Corp. $275
million and legal fees to settle a lawsuit that sought to recover about $1.7 billion
in losses that Sumitomo suffered during a 1996 copper trading scandal. Again,
Merrill Lynch announced that the settlement would "not have a material impact
on earnings reported in the second quarter of 2000."12 About a year earlier, in
July 1999, The Wall Street Journal published an article that stated that Walt
Disney Co. ("Disney") had agreed to pay an undisclosed amount exceeding $250
million to settle Jeffrey Katzenberg's breach of contract lawsuit against the
company. 13 The day before, the newspaper reported that "Disney told Wall
Street analysts that it has reserved for the amount of the settlement, which will
have no impact on its earnings."' 14 More recently, Bank of America Corp. (the
"Bank") agreed in February 2002 to pay $490 million to settle shareholder
lawsuits arising from the write-down of a loan to D.E. Shaw & Co.15 In its press
release announcing the agreement, the Bank stated that it would pay the
settlement from existing litigation reserves and insurance and that the agreement
'16
would have "no impact on the company's financial results."
12 Barry Hall, Merrill to Pay Sumitomo $275 Million to Avoid Suit Over '96 Copper
Scandal, 32 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 753,754 (2000).
13 Bruce Orwall, Observers Second-Guess Disney Handling of Feuds, WALL ST. J., July

9, 1999, at B3.
14 Bruce Orwall, A Conclusion in the Clash of Hollywood Titans, WALL ST. J., July 8,
1999, at B1.
15 Carrick Mollenkamp, Bank of America to Settle ShareholderSuits, WALL ST. J., Feb.
11, 2002, at A11. For a general description of the underlying litigation, see infra note 172.
16 Press Release, Bank of Am. Corp., Bank of America Agrees to Settle Merger-Related
Lawsuits (Feb. 8, 2002), http://www.bankofameiica.com/newsroompress/press.cfm?
PresslD=-press.20020208.02.htm&LOBID=9 (last visited Oct 20, 2002). According to a
spokesperson for the Bank, "the company's legal insurance paid for about 40% of the $490
million settlement, or approximately $196 million." Mollenkamp, supra note 15. Subtracting
that amount from the $490 million settlement means that the Bank agreed to pay about $294
million.
The Bank's 2001 Annual Report states that the Bank "recorded $334 million in litigation
expense in the fourth quarter of 2001 related to small settlements and an addition to the legal
reserve to cover increased exposure in existing litigation." BANK OF AM. CORP., 2001 ANNUAL
REPORT

34

(2002),

http://www.bankofamerica.cominvestor/index.cfm?section=700.

Interestingly, while the Bank set aside the amount for the fourth quarter of 2001 and released
its financial results for that period on January 22, 2002, it reportedly did not begin settlement
talks until mid-January. See Mollenkamp, supra note 15 ("[P]laintiffs' attorneys [in midJanuary, 2002] approached Bank of America to pursue a settlement.... [E]ventually, $490
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This article argues that existing law often allows a savvy litigator to use the
discovery process to obtain very helpful data about any litigation reserves or
contingencies 17 related to an underlying lawsuit by: (1) examining an opponent's
(a) financial statements, (b) books and records, (c) tax returns, including any
related revenue agent reports proposing changes to those returns, and (d)
correspondence with any outside auditor; (2) reviewing the opponent's public
filings, if any, with the SEC and other regulatory agencies, such as a public
utilities commission or department of insurance, in their entirety for financial
information or disclosures regarding the underlying litigation; (3) requesting
information concerning the litigation and any related litigation reserves from any
outside auditor, specifically including those portions of the audit workpapers
containing: (a) schedules and supporting documentation detailing litigation
reserves or litigation contingencies, (b) management's letter, and (c) the response
of the opponent's attorney to the audit inquiry letter; and (4) seeking any records
or information from the Public Oversight Board ("POB"), 18 SEC Practice
Section, Quality Control Inquiry Committee, and AICPA Professional Ethics
Division regarding quality control inquiries to review allegations of audit failures
contained in litigation filed against member firms in any lawsuit involving
auditor malpractice. Anecdotal evidence, however, indicates that plaintiffs often
do not pursue these opportunities during the discovery process.
Under certain circumstances, generally accepted accounting principles
("GAAP") require an enterprise to accrue an expense and usually record a
corresponding liability for various loss contingencies, including pending
lawsuits. In such scenarios, the discovery rules in the current Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure often enable an enterprise's opponent in litigation to obtain
information about the enterprise's estimate of its potential liability in any
underlying litigation involving a federal issue, such as the federal antitrust,
bankruptcy, environmental, labor discrimination, or securities laws, especially
million was offered from the Bank of America side."). This report suggests that the Bank had
not yet reached an agreement in principal with the plaintiffs when it accrued $334 million for
the fourth quarter.
17 The term "litigation contingency" refers to any potential loss stemming from litigation,
whether or not an enterprise accrues the amount on its financial statements.
18 As discussed innote 87, infra, and accompanying text, until the POB ceased operations
on May 1, 2002, the organization investigated litigation alleging audit failures involving
publicly traded enterprises to determine whether the auditor needed to take corrective actions to
strengthen its procedures or to address personnel deficiencies. Following the collapse of Enron
Corp. and the announcement of a staggering financial fraud at WorldCom, Inc., Congress
passed the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. That
legislation establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to investigate and
discipline registered public accounting frms and associated persons, but specifically protects
the Board's records from "civil discovery or other legal process." Id. §§ 101(a), (c), 105(a),
(b)(5)(A), 116 Stat. at 750-5 1, 759, 761.
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when the enterprise's personnel discuss the accrual with an outside auditor or
when the enterprise provides some bland disclosure about the accrual in a public
report. Even if the enterprise has not recognized an expense and related liability
for financial accounting purposes, the discovery rules also generally permit a
litigation opponent to review certain information related to the litigation in the
files of the enterprise's auditor, including evaluations of the enterprise's estimate
of its potential liability by the auditor, the enterprise's attorneys, and, in cases
involving auditor malpractice, the POB or any successor. To date, no other article
comprehensively discusses the potential opportunities, especially for plaintiffs,
19
for using information about litigation reserves in the underlying litigation.
As background, Part I of this article overviews the professional standards
underlying the 1975 treaty between the accounting and legal professions,
primarily Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for
Contingencies ("SFAS No. 5"), which generally sets forth the financial
accounting rules regarding contingent liabilities; Statement of Auditing
Standards No. 12, Inquiry of a Client's Lawyer Concerning Litigation, Claims,
and Assessments ("SAS No. 12"), which discusses an auditor's obligation to
obtain evidence about contingent liabilities to determine whether an enterprise
has properly treated those items in its financial statements and to request
corroborating information from the enterprise's outside counsel during any audit;
and the American Bar Association's Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers'
Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information (the "ABA Statement of
Policy"), which sets forth the legal profession's official policy on responses to
audit inquiry letters. This part also describes the particular places within an
enterprise's financial statements and books and records where an attorney may
find information regarding a particular litigation contingency. In addition, this
part begins to identify other sources for information and documentation
19 Several articles discuss certain aspects of these issues. See, e.g., Matthew A. Hodel &
Charles A. Burke, Attorney Audit Letters: The Argument Against Discovery, L.A. LAW., Mar.
1991, at 23 (concluding that existing privileges and policies protect audit inquiry responses
from discovery); Douglas G. Houser & Jeremy E. Zuck, Insurance Claim Reserves: Are They
Admissible? Or, What the ClaimantsDon't Know Can Hurt You, 52 INS. COUNS. J. 152 (1985)
(considering insurance reserves); Gita F. Rothschild & Keith McKenna, Dealing with
Accountants and Auditors: Avoiding Sanctions in Complex Cases, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 401
(1997) (discussing discovery requests and sanctions); Michael J. Sharp & Abraham M. Stanger,
Audit-Inquiry Responses in the Arena of Discovery: Protected by the Work-Product Doctrine,
56 Bus. LAw. 183 (2000) (arguing that courts should not give adversaries access to audit
inquiry responses and underlying documentation); Timothy M. Sukel & Mike F. Pipkin,

Discovery andAdmissibility of Reserves, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 191 (1998) (addressing insurance
reserves); Melissa D. Shalit, Note, Audit Inquiry Letters and Discovery: Protection Based on
Compulsion, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1263 (1994) (arguing that the work product doctrine
probably does not protect audit inquiry letters from discovery unless the enterprise can
successfully assert that compulsion forced disclosure).
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regarding litigation contingencies that opposing counsel might use in the
underlying lawsuit, including a summary of the information generated for a
business enterprise's auditors during the course of a financial statement audit.
Part Ill describes three important developments that have occurred since the
1975 accord: the enhanced disclosure rules in Management's Discussion and
Analysis, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
which held that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") could summon tax accrual
papers that the auditing firm had prepared to evaluate Amerada Hess Corp.'s
reserves for contingent tax liabilities, and the Tax Reform Act of 1984, which
added the "economic performance" requirement to § 461(h) of the Internal
Revenue Code. Collectively, these developments have significantly changed the
legal landscape and created or confirmed opportunities for discovery. In
particular, this part discusses the use of tax returns and revenue agent reports to
obtain information about a particular litigation contingency.
Part IV discusses the legal standards applicable during the discovery process.
Initially, this part analyzes the relevancy requirement in Rule 26(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as applied to information related to litigation
contingencies. Next, this part discusses the applicability of the attorney-client and
accountant-client privileges to information related to litigation reserves. Finally,
this part analyzes the applicability of the work product protection under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), which may protect information related to
litigation reserves and litigation contingencies from discovery under certain
circumstances. As a whole, however, these analyses lead to the conclusion that a
strong potential exists for obtaining this information related to litigation reserves
and litigation contingencies through discovery.
Part V concludes that existing law often allows litigation opponents access to
significant information about the evaluations of an enterprise and its auditor and
attorneys about the enterprise's exposure in the litigation, potentially evidenced
by amounts that the enterprise has already accrued as an expense under financial
accounting rules. The Commentary that accompanied the ABA Statement of
Policy explicitly states that the expectation that communications between
lawyers and auditors in accordance with the Statement of Policy would not prove
prejudicial to clients engaged in or facing adversary proceedings underlies the
Policy. If developments were to occur to negate this expectation, the ABA
Statement of Policy recognized that the American Bar Association may need to
review and revise the Statement of Policy. This article calls for such a review.
Pending that review, Part V also proposes a new rule of evidence that, similar to
Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence on liability insurance, would allow the
discovery of information about litigation reserves, but generally bar its admission
into evidence at trial.
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11. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AFFECTING LITIGATION RESERVES AND THE

CORRESPONDING BOOKS AND RECORDS, ACCOMPANYING
DOCUMENTATION, ENSUING WORKPAPERS, AND RELATED INFORMATION

The accounting, auditing, and legal professions have established rules and
standards of practice regarding litigation contingencies. Various concerns
underlie these rules and professional standards. As a starting point, enterprises
provide financial statements to owners, creditors, potential investors and lenders,
and government bodies to enable those users to reach rational investment, credit,
and similar decisions. These users often want assurances that the financial
statements contain fair and accurate representations about the enterprise's
financial condition and operating results. In addition, the federal securities laws
require publicly traded enterprises to file audited financial statements with the
SEC. As a result, an independent auditor often examines an enterprise's financial
statements to express an opinion as to whether the financial statements fairly
present the enterprise's financial position and operating results in conformity
with GAAP.20 As explained below, GAAP often requires an enterprise to accrue,
disclose, or both accrue and disclose contingent losses arising from potential and
pending litigation. 2 1 If an enterprise's financial statements do not comply with
GAAP, the enterprise and its directors and officers could find themselves
defending a lawsuit or administrative action alleging financial statement fraud or
22
securities fraud.
20

The term "generally accepted accounting principles," often abbreviated "GAAP," refers
to the "rules" governing the compilation of accounting data into financial statements and the
form and content of those statements. Although Congress has given the SEC the legal authority
to set accounting principles for those enterprises subject to its jurisdiction, the SEC has
generally deferred to the private sector's official standards-setter, currently the Financial
Accounting Standards Board. See HERwrrZ & BARRETr, supra note *, at 144-45.
21 See infra notes 25-62 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., In re Lee Pharm., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1023,
[1995-1998 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 74,538 (1998) (determining that certain environmental liabilities satisfied the
disclosure requirements under GAAP and that non-disclosure rendered the rgistrant's
financial statements materially misleading in administrative proceeding against registrant and
certain officers and directors for failing to disclose the liabilities in the financial statements); In
re Coming, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 92 Civ. 345 (TPG), 1997 WL 235122 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1997)
(concluding that the consolidated and amended class action complaint sufficiently alleged that
Coming's consolidated financial statements and periodic reports failed to reveal information
about potential liabilities that a subsidiary, Dow Coming Corp., may have incurred in
manufacturing and selling breast implants to approximately 800,000 women); Rehm v. Eagle
Fim. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (N.D. M. 1997) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss a
complaint alleging that the defendant company and executive officers failed to follow GAAP
in reporting credit losses from automobile and retail installment sales contracts with
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In an audit, the auditor seeks to gather evidence about the various
representations that management has asserted in the financial statements
regarding the enterprise's assets and liabilities at a specific date and transactions
during a particular accounting period. In that way, auditors seek to ensure the
reliability and credibility of financial statements for the various users. In
particular, an auditor must use reasonable efforts to determine whether any
material unrecorded or undisclosed liabilities exist. In every audit engagement,
therefore, the auditor must identify and evaluate both actual liabilities and any
possible losses arising from potential and pending litigation, claims, assessments,
and other uncertainties (collectively, "loss contingencies") in an effort to reach
reasonable assurance that the financial statements include all material liabilities
and appropriately disclose any contingencies. If the auditor issues an unqualified
opinion with respect to financial statements that do not appropriately treat loss
contingencies, the auditor, as well as the enterprise, can face staggering legal
liability. 23 Such potential liability, plus a desire to maintain their professional
reputations, motivates auditors to gather as much information and evidence as
possible about loss contingencies.
In every audit, the auditor asks the enterprise's management both to describe
and evaluate various contingencies, including litigation contingencies, and to
provide written assurance that the financial statements properly treat all loss
contingencies. The auditor also seeks to obtain corroborating information from
the enterprise's attorneys about contingent liabilities related to actual or possible
lawsuits, claims, and assessments. In this latter regard, the auditor typically asks
the enterprise's management to send an "audit inquiry letter" to outside counsel
requesting that counsel provide information and confirm certain understandings
regarding the enterprise's litigation contingencies.
Lawyers must exercise great care in responding to these audit inquiry letters.
If an enterprise's lawyers fail or refuse to reply to these inquiries, presumably
under some theory of confidentiality arising from the attorney-client privilege,
the auditor may qualify the audit opinion. In other circumstances, the auditor may
"sub-prime" consumers, thereby overstating earnings and artificially inflating stock prices); see
also SEC v. Trans Energy, Inc., No. 1-01-CV-02060, 2002 SEC LEXIS 465 (D.D.C. Feb. 27,
2002) (entering permanent injunction against registrant and two officers and imposing civil
penalties against the officers for failing to disclose the existence of material lawsuits that
resulted in over $1 million in consent judgments against the company in its 1998 through 2000
SEC filings).
23 See, e.g., Endo v. Albertine, 863 F. Supp. 708, 713 (N.D. nl. 1994) (denying motions
for summary judgment by issuer and auditor in class action presenting claims for alleged failure

to disclose material facts regarding contingent tax deficiencies exceeding $100 million and
environmental liabilities of more than $60 million). Although arising and decided before
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737, that legislation should not change the potential liability involved in such

circumstances.
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issue an adverse opinion or disclaim an opinion. Any report other than an
unqualified opinion can adversely affect the enterprise's ability to attract capital,
borrow funds, or even to continue in business. At the same time, a lawyer may
not disclose confidential information, including a client's litigating position, to
the auditor without the client's consent. If the enterprise authorizes the lawyer to
disclose information to the auditor, lest the auditor refuse to render an
unqualified opinion, at a minimum the enterprise waives the attorney-client
privilege as to any information disclosed. 24
In an effort to balance the conflicting interests that exist under these
circumstances, the legal and accounting professions reached a 1975 accord,
sometimes referred to as "The Treaty," which ultimately led to the financial
accounting rules set forth in SFAS No. 5, the auditing standards in SAS No. 12,
and the ABA's Statement of Policy.
A. The FinancialAccounting Rules and Resulting Documentation
SFAS No. 5 creates a framework for analyzing accounting issues involving
loss contingencies, but generally allows an enterprise's management to exercise
considerable discretion in determining whether to accrue and how to disclose a
loss contingency. Under the financial accounting rules, loss contingencies
include pending or threatened litigation and actual or possible claims or
assessments.2 5 Because SFAS No. 5 gives management broad discretion,
accounting for contingencies more closely resembles an art than a science.
Depending upon the underlying circumstances, an enterprise's management may
have to choose among both fully accruing and disclosing the loss contingency,
fully accruing but not disclosing, accruing in part and disclosing the rest,
accruing in part but not disclosing the rest, or merely disclosing the contingency
in the financial statements. On the other hand, if the contingency qualifies as
sufficiently unlikely to occur, the enterprise need not even disclose the matter.
SFAS No. 5 defines a "loss contingency" as "an existing condition, situation,
or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible [loss] to an enterprise
24 Although numerous states have enacted an accountant-client privilege, the common
law did not recognize such a privilege, and no such privilege generally exists under federal law.
Because the lawyer prepares the response in connection with an annual audit that would occur
even without the underlying litigation, the response arguably represents an "ordinary business
record," which does not qualify for protection from discovery or use as evidence at trial under
the work product doctrine. See infra notes 265-320 and accompanying text.
25 Other examples of loss contingencies include the collectibility of receivables that arise
from credit sales, loans, or other transactions; obligations related to product warranties and
product defects; threats of expropriation; and guarantees of another's indebtedness.
AccOuNTING FOR CONTINGENcIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, 4
(Financial Accounting Standards Bd.1975).

20021

OPPORTUNITIES

1033

that will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or fail to
occur." 26 The uncertainty's resolution may confirm that at least one of the
enterprise's assets has suffered an impairment or that the enterprise has incurred
at least one liability. Either of these situations would require the enterprise to
record a corresponding loss or expense as a charge against income. Together
with other accounting pronouncements, SFAS No. 5 provides separate, but
presumably similar, rules governing financial accounting and reporting for (i)
pending litigation, claims, and assessments and (ii) unasserted claims and
assessments. Although information regarding litigation reserves sometimes
appears in the financial statements or notes to those statements, more commonly
an attorney interested in obtaining such information must carefully review the
enterprise's books and records, including the chart of accounts, general ledger,
general journal, and supporting documentation.
1. Pending Litigation, Claims, andAssessments
An enterprise must assess various factors in determining the proper financial
accounting treatment of any loss contingency. For pending litigation, claims, and
assessments, the most important factors include materiality; the accounting
period in which the underlying event that gave rise to the litigation, claim, or
assessment occurred; the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome to the enterprise;
and the enterprise's ability to reasonably estimate any likely loss.27 For
unasserted claims, a business must first assess the probability of assertion. If the
enterprise concludes that the circumstances suggest that the potentially adverse
party will not assert the claim, SFAS No. 5 does not require accrual or disclosure.
By comparison, if assertion seems probable, the enterprise must proceed in
exactly the same manner as if the potentially adverse party had already asserted
28
the claim.
a. FactorsAffecting FinancialAccounting Treatment
For pending litigation and existing claims or assessments, SFAS No. 5
requires an enterprise to consider four factors in determining the proper financial
accounting treatment: (1) the materiality of the litigation, claims, or assessments
to the enterprise's financial condition and operating results; (2) the period in
26

Id. 1 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the pronouncement defines a "gain contingency"
as "an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible
gain ... to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur

or fail to occur." Id.
27

See infra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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which the underlying cause that gave rise to the litigation, claim, or assessment
occurred; (3) the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome to the enterprise; and (4)
the enterprise's ability to estimate reasonably any potential loss.
i. Materiality
As an initial matter, an enterprise should consider materiality because SFAS
No. 5 does not apply to immaterial items. 29 About five years after issuing SFAS
No. 5, the Financial Accounting Standards Board described "materiality" as
"[t]he magnitude of an omission or misstatement of accounting information that,
in light of surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that the judgment of a
reasonable person relying on the information would have been changed or
influenced by the omission or misstatement. '30 As a general rule, accountants
have historically treated any amount which does not exceed five percent of
income before taxes or owners' equity as immaterial. By comparison,
accountants have typically considered any item which exceeds ten percent of
3
income before taxes or owners' equity to be material. '
ii. UnderlyingEvent
Under SFAS No. 5, an enterprise can accrue an amount related to a loss
contingency only if information available prior to the issuance of financial
statements indicates that the underlying event or events that gave rise to the
contingency had impaired an asset or created a liability at the date of the
financial statements.32 As a result, an enterprise cannot accrue any amount for a
loss contingency when the underlying event or condition occurred after the date
of the financial statements, but before the enterprise issues the financial
statements. For example, SFAS No. 5 would preclude an accrual for a lawsuit
seeking damages resulting from an accident that occurred after the date of the
financial statements. 33 As discussed below, however, SFAS No. 5 may require
the enterprise to disclose the existence of a potential loss incurred after the date
29 ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 25, in the note following
30

QUALTATvE CHARAcrERISTIcs

OF ACCOUNTING

20.

INFO., Statement of Financial

Accounting Concepts No. 2, at xv (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1980).
31 See LuAnn Bean & Deborah W. Thomas, The Development of the JudicialDefinition
of Materiality, 17 Acr. HISTORIANS J. 113, 114 (1990); see also Charles Johnson et al.,
Materialityfor ExtraordinaryItems, NAT'L PUB. ACer., Dec. 1990, at 42, 43 (listing other

mathematical guidelines for average net income, total revenues, total assets, and owners'
equity). The legal standard for materiality, however, may differ from the financial accounting
standard. See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
32
ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 25, 34.
33 Id.
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of the financial statements to keep the financial statements from being
34
misleading.
By comparison, SFAS No. 5 may require an enterprise to accrue an amount
related to a loss contingency involving a lawsuit, claim, or assessment when the
underlying cause occurred on or before the date of the enterprise's financial
statements, even though the enterprise does not learn about "the existence or
possibility of the lawsuit, claim, or assessment until after the date of the financial
statements. '35 Because the underlying event or condition occurred on or before
the date of the financial statements, any information available prior to the
issuance of the financial statements can affect the proper accounting treatment.
Therefore, subsequent events and developments can change the appropriate
accounting and reporting until the enterprise has issued the financial statements.
iii. Likelihood of an Unfavorable Outcome
When a loss contingency exists, SFAS No. 5 divides the likelihood that some
future event or events will confirm a loss into three categories: probable,
reasonably possible, and remote. SFAS No. 5 describes the likelihood of an
unfavorable outcome as "probable" when "[t]he future event or events are likely
to occur." 36 Although SFAS No. 5 itself does not provide any additional
guidance about what the words "probable" or "likely" mean, the related
37
explanation states that the word "probable" does not infer "virtual certainty.
34 Id.; see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
35 ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note
36d. 3a.
37

25, 35.

Id. 84. Subsequent accounting pronouncements offer only slightly more insight about

when the chances of an unfavorable outcome fall within the "probable" area. In 1985, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") issued Statement of Financial Accounting
Concepts No. 6, Elements of Financial Statements ("Concepts Statement No. 6"), which
explicitly draws a distinction between the "usual general meaning" of the word "probable" and
its use in "a specific accounting or technical sense (such as that in [SFAS No. 5])." ELEMENTS
OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: A REPLACEMENT OF FASB CONCEPTS STATEMENT No. 3
(INCORPORATING AN AMENDMENT OF FASB CONCEPTS STATEMENT No. 2), Statement of

Financial Accounting Concepts No. 6 ?g 25 n.18, 35 n.21 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd.
1985). In two footnotes, Concepts Statement No. 6 describes the "usual general meaning" as
"that which can reasonably be expected or believed on the basis of available evidence or logic
but is neither certain or proved," but does not further explain the meaning of the word
"probable" in SFAS No. 5. Id (citing WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE 1132 (2d college ed. 1982)). In the explanation to Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 109, Accounting for Income Taxes, which the FASB issued in
1992, the Board refers to the footnotes in Concepts Statement No. 6 that discuss the word
"probable." ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME TAXES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 109, 94 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1992). In addition, the Board specifically
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Elsewhere, the accompanying explanation refers to this requirement as "not so
past-oriented that accrual of a loss must await the occurrence of the confirming
future event, for example, final adjudication or settlement of a lawsuit. '38
Given this ambiguity, readers can easily assign different meanings to the
terms "probable" or "likely to occur." A lawyer, for example, might describe the
terms as meaning "more likely than not" or "anything greater than fifty percent."
With no explanation, one commentator describes the expression as "somewhat
more likely than 50 percent, say 60 to 70 percent. ' 39 In contrast, a leading
accounting text describes the phrase as "at least 80 percent."40
At the other end of the spectrum, SFAS No. 5 describes the likelihood of an
unfavorable outcome as "remote" when "[t]he chance of the future event or
events occurring is slight." 4' As the third and final alternative, SFAS No. 5
designates the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome as "reasonably possible,"
which the pronouncement describes as "more than remote but less than likely." '4 2
Most commentators, therefore, believe that "reasonably possible" serves as a
default category.
SFAS No. 5 further states that an enterprise should consider factors, such as
the progress of the case, opinion of legal counsel, prior experience of the
enterprise or other enterprises in similar matters, and management's intended
response, when assessing the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome. 43 When
assessing the progress of the case, an enterprise should assess the stage of the
claim or litigation, such as discovery or trial. In considering the opinion of legal
counsel, SFAS No. 5 explicitly states that even if counsel cannot give a favorable
opinion, the business may still not have satisfied the necessary conditions for loss
accrual. With regard to management's intended response, management may plan
to contest the case vigorously or to try to settle.
distinguishes "probable" and "more likely than not." Id. 93. For purposes of measuring a
deferred tax asset, the Board expressly rejected "probable" within the meaning of SFAS No. 5
as the applicable criterion. Instead, the Board selected the phrase "more likely than not" as the
criterion and explicitly stated that those words establish "a level of likelihood that is more than

50 percent." Id %96, 97.
38
ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 25, 68.
39
GEORGE MUNDSTOCK, A FINANCE APPROACH TO ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 149 n.6
(1999). Because SFAS uses the term "probable" to refer to both the likelihood of assertion and
the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome, I have long suggested to my students that SFAS No.
5 offers some support for treating "probable" as approximately 70.7%. See infra note 62.
40

CLYDE P. ST1CKNEY & ROMAN L. WELL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN INTRODUCTION

TO CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND USES 520 n.4 (8th ed. 1997) ("[Mjost accountants and auditors

appear to use probableto mean 80 to 85 percent or larger.").
41 ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 25,
42 Id 3b.
43 Id

36.

3c.
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iv. Ability to Reasonably Estimate the PotentialLoss
If an enterprise determines that circumstances suggest that the chance that
future events will confirm a loss qualifies as probable and the enterprise can
reasonably estimate the loss, the enterprise must accrue a loss in that amount. In
many situations where an enterprise has probably incurred a loss, however, the
enterprise cannot reasonably estimate any single loss amount, but can only
identify a wide range of possible losses. When some amount within a range
seems like a better estimate than any other amount within the range, an enterprise
should accrue that amount.44 If the enterprise cannot determine a best estimate
within the range, the enterprise should accrue the minimum amount in the range
and disclose any reasonably possible additional loss that satisfies the other
requirements in SFAS No. 5.45 When the enterprise cannot reasonably estimate
the loss, SFAS No. 5 requires disclosure, rather than accrual, whenever the
likelihood of occurrence qualifies as at least "reasonably possible. ' '46 The
disclosure must indicate the nature of the contingency and must either (i) give an
estimate of the potential loss or range of loss or (ii) state that the enterprise
cannot make such an estimate. 47 The requirement that an enterprise cannot
accrue a loss until the enterprise can reasonably estimate the amount seeks to
preclude enterprises from accruing amounts so uncertain as to impair the
financial statements' integrity.4 8

b. FinancialAccounting Alternatives
Depending upon the underlying circumstances, an enterprise may have to (i)
both accrue and disclose a loss, (ii) accrue but not disclose the loss, (iii) accrue
part of a potential loss and disclose the remaining contingency, or (iv) simply
disclose the contingency. If a contingency qualifies as sufficiently unlikely to
occur, however, the enterprise need not even disclose the matter.
i. Accrual of Loss Contingencies
Paragraph eight of SFAS No. 5 both requires and allows an enterprise to
accrue an estimated loss only if both: (1) information available prior to the
44 REASONABLE ESTIMATION OF THE AMOUNT OF A LOSS: AN INTERPRETATION OF FASB
STATEMENT No. 5, FASB Interpretation No. 14, 3 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd.
1976).
45 Id
46
ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 25, 10.
47 Id.
48 Id.

59.
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issuance of financial statements indicates that the enterprise probably, or at least
more likely than not, incurred a liability or suffered the impairment of an asset
before the date of the financial statements; and (2) the enterprise can reasonably
estimate the loss. 49 To reiterate, a business must satisfy both conditions of
paragraph eight to accrue a loss contingency. By imposing these requirements,
SFAS No. 5 seeks to ensure that any accrued losses relate to the current or a prior
period. If the circumstances do not indicate that the enterprise has at least more
likely than not incurred a loss and the enterprise cannot reasonably estimate the
loss, the potential loss relates to a future period. 50 In addition, paragraph nine of
SFAS No. 5 may require the enterprise to disclose the nature of the accrual, and
perhaps its amount, to keep the financial statements from becoming
51
misleading.
When read literally SFAS No. 5 would arguably also preclude an enterprise,
such as Merrill Lynch or Disney, from accruing an amount which reflects the
expected loss. For example, assume a defendant foresees a twenty percent chance
of losing the lawsuit, but an eighty percent chance of winning. If the defendant
loses, the defendant expects a fifty percent chance of a $500 million verdict and a
fifty percent chance of a $2 billion verdict. As a result, the defendant calculates
an expected $250 million liability, 52 even though the defendant does not
anticipate any scenario in which the actual loss would equal that amount.
Because the defendant predicts an eighty percent chance of success, the
likelihood of loss presumably falls into the reasonably possible category and
53
SFAS No. 5 arguably precludes the defendant from accruing any amount.
ii. Disclosureof Loss Contingencies
SFAS No. 5 precludes an enterprise from accruing a litigation contingency
unless both the loss qualifies as probable and the enterprise can reasonably
estimate the loss. Absent accrual, the enterprise's income statement and balance
sheet would not reflect the loss contingency. Several different sets of
circumstances, however, require disclosure of a litigation contingency. First, if
49 IdT
50

8.

d. 59.
d 9.
52 With a twenty percent chance of losing, the defendant faces a ten percent chance (fifty
percent of twenty percent) of losing $500 million and a ten percent chance of losing $2 billion.
As a result, the total estimated loss equals $250 million [(.10 x $500 million) + (.10 x $2
billion)]. An alternative reading of SFAS No. 5 would conclude that under these circumstances
the enterprise justifiably expects to incur a $250 million loss, which would satisfy both the
requirements that the loss qualifies as "probable" and that the enterprise can reasonably
estimate that loss.
53 See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
51
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management assesses the chance of an unfavorable outcome as reasonably
possible, the enterprise must disclose the litigation contingency. 54 Similarly, if
exposure to a loss exists in excess of the amount accrued, the enterprise must
disclose the potential unaccrued loss when at least a reasonable possibility exists
that the enterprise has incurred such a loss. 55 Third, when management
concludes that the chance of an unfavorable outcome qualifies as probable, but
cannot determine a reasonable estimate of the loss amount, the enterprise must
again disclose the contingency. 56 In addition, an enterprise must disclose any
contingent obligations arising from guarantees. 57 Any disclosures shall indicate:
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding the district
court's conclusion that SFAS No. 5 required various mutual funds to include a footnote in their
financial statements disclosing contingent liabilities for not registering under state blue sky
laws as long as a reasonable possibility existed that the liabilities would materialize).
56
ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 25, 10.
57

Id. 12. Separate from loss contingencies from pending or unasserted litigation, claims,
or assessments, SFAS No. 5 also provides separate accounting rules for financial guarantees.
Such guarantees include: "(a) guarantees of indebtedness of others, (b) obligations of
commercial banks under 'standby letters of credit,' and (c) guarantees to repurchase receivables
(or, in some cases, to repurchase the related property) that have been sold or otherwise
assigned." Id SFAS No. 5 requires an enterprise that has any such guarantee to disclose the
guarantee in its financial statements, even when the enterprise assesses the possibility of loss as
only remote. Id Enterprises should disclose "the nature and amount of the guarantee," and, if
the enterprise has the right to proceed against a third party, the value of such recovery, if
estimable. Id Like other contingencies, however, paragraph twelve does not apply to
immaterial amounts. When an enterprise determines that a financial guarantee will not
materially affect its financial position, SFAS No. 5 does not require that the enterprise disclose
the guarantee in the notes to the financial statements. See id
The Enron crisis illustrates the importance of disclosing financial guarantees in the notes
to the financial statements. When various Enron affiliates, commonly referred to as special
purpose entities (SPEs), that Enron formed to keep debt off its books sought credit, the lenders
often required that Enron guarantee the debt. On several occasions, Enron guaranteed amounts
that various SPEs borrowed by promising to pay cash or to issue additional common shares to
repay the debt, if the market price of Enron's common shares dropped under a certain amount
or if Enron's bond rating fell below investment grade. While the notes to Enron's financial
statements disclosed guarantees of the indebtedness of others, Enron did not mention that its
potential liability on those guarantees, which shared common debt repayment triggers, totaled
$4 billion. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of ShareholderValue, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275 (2002).
In May 2002, the FASB issued a proposed interpretation for accounting for and disclosing
financial guarantees. GUARANTOR'S ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR
GUARANTEES,

INCLUDING INDIRECT GUARANTEES

OF INDEBTEDNESS OF OTHERS: AN

INTERPRETATION OF FASB STATEMENTS No. 5, 57 AND 107, Financial Accounting Series
Exposure Draft (Financial Accounting Standards Bd., Proposed Interpretation, May 22, 2002),
http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed-prop-interp-guarantees.pdf. In addition to the nature and amount
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(1) the nature of the claim and (2) either (a) an estimate of possible loss or range
of possible loss or (b) a statement that the business cannot make a reasonable
estimate. In these circumstances, an attorney can usually find any disclosures
about any material contingencies in the notes to the financial statements,
58
typically in a note labeled "Commitments and Contingencies."
The following chart summarizes the rules in SFAS No. 5 for treating
material, asserted claims that arise from underlying events that occurred before
the date of the financial statements:
ACCOUNTING TREATMENT FOR ASSERTED CLAIMS
Ability to Reasonably Estimate
the Potential Loss
Reasonable
No Reasonable
Estimate
Estimate
Accrue and, if
Disclose
Probable-likely necessary, disclose contingency and
to occur
to avoid
range of possible
misleading
loss or state that
financial
no reasonable
statements
estimate possible
Likelihood of
Reasonably
Disclose
Disclose
an Unfavorable possible-less
contingency and
contingency and
Outcome
than probable but estimated amount range of possible
more than remote of possible loss
loss or state that
no reasonable
estimate possible
Remote-slight

Neither accrue nor
disclose, unless
guarantee

Neither accrue nor
disclose, unless
guarantee

of the guarantee and any potential recovery, the proposed interpretation requires a guarantor to
disclose "the maximum potential amount of future payments under the guarantee" and "the
carrying amount of the liability, if any." l at ii, 6. Regarding the disclosure of any potential
recovery, the proposed interpretation does not limit such disclosure to only estimable amounts.
Id. Although SFAS No. 5 requires the guarantor to disclose potential recovery amounts, the
proposed interpretation states that "[blecause entities generally disclose only the nature and

amount of guarantees, the disclosures under current practice do not provide the same level of
useful information as would be required under this proposed Interpretation." Id. at ii (emphasis
added). The proposed interpretation also requires a guarantor to recognize a liability at the
inception of the guarantee for the fair value of all of the obligations it undertook when it issued
the guarantee. Id at ii, 6, 8.
58

See, e.g., 1994 MERRatL LYNCH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 44-45.
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As discussed above, an enterprise may have to disclose information about an
accrual to prevent the financial statements from becoming misleading. 59 Finally,
an enterprise must also disclose information about contingencies from so-called
"subsequent events" or underlying events that occurred after the date of the
financial statements, but before the enterprise issued the financial statements and
6°
which could have a material effect on the financials.
2. UnassertedClaims
For unasserted claims, a business must first assess the probability of
assertion. If the enterprise concludes that the circumstances suggest that the
potentially adverse party will not assert the claim, SFAS No. 5 does not require
accrual or disclosure. By comparison, if assertion seems probable, the enterprise
must proceed in exactly the same manner as if the potentially adverse party had
61
already asserted the claim.

Weird outcomes can seemingly result from applying the rules regarding
unasserted claims, especially if an enterprise interprets "probable" as meaning
"more likely than not." Assume that an enterprise assigns a 51% chance to the
probability that the claimant will assert a $100 million claim and a 51% chance
to an unfavorable outcome on the full claim. Under SFAS No. 5 and those
circumstances, the enterprise must potentially accrue, and perhaps disclose, a
$100 million loss even though the overall chance that the enterprise will incur the
loss equals 26.01% (51% times 51%).62
59

See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 25, 11.
61 See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
62
To avoid this problem, and at the risk of suggesting that either a lawyer, an accountant,
or any other mortal could precisely quantify such an amount, I have argued that SFAS No. 5
implicitly treats the term "probable" as meaning at least the square root of any amount greater
than 50%, or no less than approximately 70.711% (.70711 x .70711 = .5000045521). Based
upon SFAS No. 5's articulated interest in preserving the integrity of financial statements, I
would argue that, notwithstanding the promulgation's ambiguity, it does not contemplate that
an enterprise should accrue a loss to reflect an unasserted claim unless the likelihood of an
unfavorable outcome at least exceeds 50%. Before an enterprise can accrue a loss related to an
unasserted claim, the enterprise must reach two separate conclusions. First, the enterprise must
determine the degree of probability that the aggrieved party will assert the claim. Only if the
enterprise considers assertion "probable" does the enterprise proceed to the second
determination, where the enterprise must assess the possibility of an unfavorable outcome. In
that regard, paragraph thirty-eight states:
60

[A] judgment must first be made as to whether the assertion of a claim is probable. If the
judgment is that assertion is not probable, no accrual or disclosure would be required. On
the other hand, if the judgment is that assertion is probable, then a second judgment must
be made as to the degree of probability of an unfavorable outcome. If an unfavorable
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3. FinancialAccounting Information and Documentation
Related to Loss Contingencies
Reading an enterprise's financial statements typically will not reveal whether
the enterprise has established a litigation reserve related to an underlying lawsuit.
In most cases, a lawyer seeking to find litigation reserves must carefully review
the enterprise's books and records. Assuming that the enterprise complies with
GAAP and maintains adequate and accurate books and records, the enterprise's
general journal, general ledger, and supporting documentation will indicate when
an enterprise has created a litigation reserve related to particular litigation and the
amount of that reserve.
When reviewing a litigation opponent's financial statements, a number of
specific areas within those documents may provide clues regarding
management's determinations regarding litigation contingencies. In some
circumstances, SFAS No. 5 requires an enterprise to disclose an accrual to
prevent the financial statements from becoming misleading. 6 3 In such event,
disclosure will appear either on the face of the financial statements themselves
or, more likely, in the notes to the financial statements. As a result, an attorney
might sometimes identify the establishment of a litigation reserve in the footnotes
to the financial statements. For example, the notes to the consolidated financial
statements of Wabash National Corp., a company listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, for the year ended December 31, 1998 provided, in pertinent part, the
following information about a tax assessment:
On December 24, 1998, the Company received notice from the Internal Revenue
Service that it intends to assess federal excise tax on certain used trailers restored
by the Company during 1996 and 1997. The Company strongly disagrees with
and intends to vigorously contest the assessment. In applying generally accepted
accounting principles, the Company recorded a $4.6 million accrual in 1998 for
this loss contingency that is reflected in Other, net in the accompanying
64
Consolidated Statements of Income.
outcome is probable and the amount of loss can be reasonably estimated, accrual of a loss
is required by paragraph 8.
ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 25, 38. Because SFAS No. 5 uses the term
"probable" to refer to both the likelihood of assertion and the likelihood of an unfavorable
outcome, and weird outcomes result if the circumstances suggest a 50% or less chance of
ultimate liability, the term "probable" must mean something around at least 70.711%.
63 ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 25, 9; see also supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
64 WABASH NAT'L CORP., FORM 10-K, ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR
15(d) OF THE SECURIMES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 41 (for the fiscal year ended Dec. 31,

1998) (filed Mar. 31, 1999).
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Because enterprises almost certainly do not want to reveal the amount of a
litigation reserve to any opponent in the underlying litigation, and any particular
litigation contingency rarely involves a large enough dollar amount in relation to
the enterprise's assets, other liabilities, owners' equity, or revenues, the financial
statements only rarely contain a specific line-item for a particular litigation
contingency. 65 To identify a litigation reserve, if any, related to an underlying
lawsuit, an attorney must request information about any litigation contingencies
during discovery by submitting interrogatories and related requests for the
production of documents or by deposing one or more members of the enterprise's
management that oversees financial accounting and reporting. In either
alternative, the attorney may need to work backwards through the double-entry
bookkeeping system that most enterprises use to maintain financial accounting
66
records and to prepare financial statements.
The style and form of an enterprise's financial accounting system will vary
from firm to firm. In general, however, the financial statements represent the
"ends" in a process that accountants refer to as double-entrybookkeeping. As the
"means" in the process, business enterprises use journals, ledgers, accounts,
debits, credits, charts of accounts, trial balances, and worksheets. These
accounting records and concepts underlie the financial statements.
Under double-entry bookkeeping, the individual who performs the
bookkeeping function for the enterprise first records transactions chronologically
in a separate book, usually referred to as the journal.Enterprises may use various
kinds of journals, but every business will use a generaljournal. An enterprise
may also create a journal to record transactions in various functions, such as a
sales journal, a purchases journal, a cash receipts journal, or a cash
disbursements journal. The general journal typically contains five columns for
the date, the accounts involved and any explanation of the transaction, a
cross-reference for the account number to which the bookkeeper transferred the
amount in the journal entry, and separate columns for debits and credits. The
terms "debit" and "credit" simply refer to left-hand and right-hand entries,
respectively. Debits reflect increases in assets or decreases in either liabilities or

65 Generally, the balance sheet will reflect any litigation reserves in a line item labeled
something like "Accrued Liabilities," "Other Current Liabilities," or "Other Liabilities." If the
enterprise expects to pay the liability within one year of the date of the balance sheet, the line
item would appear under current liabilities. Similarly, the income statement will usually reflect

the corresponding expense or loss in "General and Administrative" expenses. Finally, even
though an increase in a litigation reserve does not require a cash outlay, because most
enterprises use the indirect method to report cash flows from operating activities, the
enterprise's statement of cash flows would typically show only the net increase or decrease in
payables, including any litigation reserves.
66 See generally HERwrrz & BARRETT, supra note *, at 14-38, 112-14.
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equity. Credits record decreases in assets or increases in either liabilities or

equity.
Today, most enterprises use computers to keep their journals, but the
fundamental concepts remain the same. After an event or transaction has been
recorded in the journal, the entries are then entered in the appropriate accounts, a
process known as posting from the journal to the ledger. Accountants refer to the
general ledger as the collection of all the asset, liability, equity, revenue, gain,
expense, and loss accounts that an enterprise maintains. The ledger, therefore,
stores in one place all the information about changes in specific account
balances, including any litigation reserves. Again, businesses often keep various
kinds of ledgers, but every business will use a general ledger. An enterprise may
also keep subledgers when it needs to keep very detailed records. For example,
an enterprise may use an accounts receivable subledger to record the individual
amounts that each customer owes to the enterprise. The accounts receivable
account in the general ledger would keep track of the total amount owed to the
firm by all its customers. The sum of the subsidiary accounts in the subledger
must equal the balance in the accounts receivable account in the general ledger.
Until computers took over most bookkeeping, enterprises often used a
looseleaf binder or card file for each ledger, with each account kept on a separate
sheet or card. Even today, however, most enterprises number each account for
identification purposes and usually place the accounts in the general ledger in
balance sheet order, starting with assets. Accounts for liabilities, equity, revenues
and gains, and expenses and losses usually follow, in that order. Most enterprises
have prepared a chart of accounts, which lists each account and the account
number which identifies the account's location in the ledger. As with journals,
most enterprises today use computerized ledgers, but the underlying concepts
still remain the same.
During the closing process, the enterprise's bookkeeping system first
determines the balance in each account by netting one side against the other. At
this point, many enterprises will generate a trial balance. The trial balance lists all
accounts in the general ledger and their balances to confirm that debits equal
credits. Next, the bookkeeper will prepare any necessary adjusting entries,
including entries to accrue any loss contingencies, in an effort to allocate
revenues and expenses to accounting periods, regardless of when the cash
receipts or expenditures actually occur. After posting any adjusting entries to the
ledger, many enterprises prepare an adjusted trial balance, which lists all
accounts in the general ledger and their balances after the enterprise has posted
any adjusting entries.
Next, the bookkeeper prepares closing journal entries which transfer the
balances in the revenue, gain, expense, and loss accounts to a clearinghouse
Profit and Loss account and posts those entries to the ledger. Then, a final
closing entry transfers the balance in the Profit and Loss account to the
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appropriate equity account. Again, the enterprise's accounting function posts this
entry to the ledger. Only as the final step in the process, does the enterprise
prepare financial statements.
Especially when deposing someone from the enterprise's management or
accounting department, a lawyer may have to work backwards through the
bookkeeping process. As a first step, however, the attorney should try to obtain
the enterprise's general ledger, adjusted trial balance for the most recent
accounting period, and chart of accounts, or their equivalents. When trying to
understand an enterprise's accounting records so as to find an expense arising
from a litigation contingency, the knowledgeable attorney typically starts with
the chart of accounts. By scanning the chart of accounts, the attorney may locate
expenses related to a particular litigation contingency by looking for account
names such as "Litigation Expense" or "Expected Loss from Litigation."
Wherever possible, enterprises will try to bury expenses related to such expenses
in other accounts, such as "Salaries and Wages" for employment discrimination
costs or "Miscellaneous Expenses." In addition, the accounting literate attorney
scans the chart of accounts for any "reserve" accounts by looking for account
names for liabilities such as "Accrued Litigation Costs Payable," "Estimated
Liability for Litigation," "Litigation Liabilities Payable," "Litigation Provision,"
"Litigation Reserve," "Provision for Litigation," and "Reserve for Litigation." In
the absence of such liability account titles, an attorney may find hidden litigation
reserves in more generally titled accounts such as "Accrued Liabilities,"
"Accrued Payables," "Miscellaneous Payables," and "Other Accrued
Liabilities."
Once the attorney identifies a potentially relevant account, the attorney must
often trace individual items in the account back to the appropriate journal entries.
Once the attorney has found any journal entries related to a litigation reserve, the
attorney should next ask to see the supporting documentation for those entries.
The style and form of the documentation that an enterprise generates
regarding litigation losses and expenses varies from firm to firm. Every
enterprise that prepares financial statements in accordance with GAAP, however,
must consider, at least tacitly, the following factors, specified in SFAS No. 5,
when evaluating the probability of an unfavorable outcome: (1) the nature of the
litigation; (2) the progress of the case; (3) the opinions or views of legal counsel
and other advisers; (4) the experience of the enterprise in similar cases; (5) the
experience of other enterprises; and (6) any decision of the enterprise's
management as to how it intends to respond to the litigation. 67 Although SFAS
No. 5 refers to these factors as merely "among" those considerations that

67 See ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 25,

accompanying text.

36; see also supra note 43 and
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management should evaluate, 68 functionally they represent a fairly exhaustive
listing.
Management's consideration of the nature of the litigation seems intertwined
with all five of the other factors. For example, after a district court denies the
enterprise's motion to dismiss in a securities fraud cause of action, management
might tend to expect to begin settlement negotiations in the near future. In those
circumstances, consideration implicates the nature of the litigation, the progress
69
of the case, and the enterprise's experience in similar cases. Although
management may rely on the views of legal counsel, the nature of the litigation
may provide management with the information needed to reach a determination
regarding the probability of a settlement. Management's consideration of the
nature of the litigation may result in memoranda that discuss the litigation in
comparison to similar lawsuits, whether based on the enterprise's own
experience or the experiences of other enterprises.
The enterprise's experience with similar lawsuits, in particular, may also
lead to extremely helpful documentation. All enterprises seek to reduce expenses,
including attorney fees. As an enterprise's management experiences more and
more lawsuits of a similar nature, either management or the accounting
department may tend to rely less on legal counsel to make any financial reporting
determinations. This tendency also may generate intra-office correspondence that
would likely not enjoy either attomey-client privilege or work product protection.
Such communications might reveal witnesses or facts not known to the
claimant's attorney, or even management's opinions and conclusions regarding
the enterprise's liability or the case's settlement value.
Cost-cutting considerations aside, most enterprises will continue to rely upon
their legal counsel to develop opinions and conclusions regarding litigation
contingencies. Management might request direct responses from the enterprise's
in-house legal department or outside counsel, hold meetings with those attorneys,
or simply rely on communications that the lawyers and management exchanged
during the on-going litigation. To support an accrual or disclosure, the
individuals responsible for SFAS No. 5 determinations, whether management or
the enterprise's accounting personnel, might document and retain such
communications in a file related to the financial statements. Many enterprises, in

68

69

ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 25,

36.
JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURTms REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 976 (2d ed.

1997) (stating that "[ilt is generally believed that the defendants are more risk averse" and can
"therefore be expected to favor... settlement, especially if it is significantly less than they risk
losing through trial").
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the ordinary course of business, will monitor ongoing litigation against the
70
enterprise to ensure adequate litigation reserves to absorb expected losses.
Any time an enterprise needs audited financial statements, its financial
statements must comply with GAAP. As such, the enterprise's balance sheet,
income statement, statement of cash flows, and the notes to the financial
statements must comply with SFAS No. 5. If an attorney can identify an expense
arising from the litigation on the income statement, a litigation reserve on the
balance sheet, or an adjustment on the statement of cash flows related to a
litigation reserve, the attorney can conclude that management has determined that
the chances of an unfavorable outcome in the lawsuit exceed fifty percent. 7 1 In
addition, the existence of expenses related to a litigation contingency also reveals
that management has put at least an estimated value on the lawsuit.72 Even if the
attorney can only identify a disclosure regarding a litigation contingency, the
disclosure reveals that management has at least contemplated the probability of
an unfavorable outcome and has likely generated some documentation to support
its decision to disclose the litigation contingency. 73 Finally, an attorney who can
find neither an accrual nor disclosure of a contingency related to the operative
lawsuit still need not give up on pursuit of documentation related to the lawsuit.
The lack of disclosure may mean simply that the lawsuit represents an immaterial
item to the enterprise as a whole; alternatively, management might have
knowledge of facts that, in its opinion, supports a conclusion of only a remote
possibility that the enterprise will lose the lawsuit. In either case, either
management or a third party, such as the outside auditor, may have generated
useful documentation and information related to the lawsuit.
B. Auditing Standardsand Related Documentation
While many small businesses do not require audited financial statements,
many mid-sized and most larger businesses undergo annual audits. In particular,
so-called registrants,specifically those companies whose shares are listed on a
national securities exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange or The
Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., or which meet certain tests relating to total assets and
number of shareholders, must file audited financial statements with the SEC. 74 In
70

See, e.g., Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987) (regarding

manufacturer that maintained a corporate risk management department that monitored product
liability litigation to "keep track of, control, and anticipate the costs of... litigation").
71 See supra notes 39-40 and 49-51 and accompanying text.
72 See supra notes 44-45 and 49-51 and accompanying text.
73 See supra notes 54-58 and 67-69 and accompanying text.
74 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm
(2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000). Under existing rules, enterprises with $10 million or more
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addition, many privately-held companies must supply audited financial
statements to lenders or to shareholders. Finally, even governmental entities, notfor-profit organizations, churches, and other organizations frequently undergo
audits.
Financial statements present various assertions, including that reported
liabilities actually exist; expenses and losses occurred during the particular
accounting period; the financial statements record the enterprise's liabilities,
expenses, and losses at appropriate amounts; and the financial statements contain
any necessary disclosures. 75 In every audit engagement, therefore, generally
accepted auditing standards require the auditor to use reasonable efforts to
determine whether any material unrecorded or undisclosed liabilities exist. In
particular, the auditor must obtain evidence about contingent liabilities arising
from litigation, claims, assessments, and other uncertainties to determine whether
76
the enterprise has properly treated those items in the financial statements.
1. Audit Procedures
SAS No. 12 offers guidance to auditors regarding the appropriate procedures
for obtaining evidence and evaluating management's assertions related to
litigation contingencies. 77 Those procedures require an auditor to obtain certain
information and representations from the client, examine certain documents that
might reveal litigation, and seek corroborating audit evidence from the client's
lawyer. First, SAS No. 12 requires the auditor to obtain a description and
evaluation of litigation, including identification of matters referred to legal
counsel, from management. As part of this process, the auditor requests a
"management letter," which provides written assurances that the audit client has
properly treated all asserted and unasserted claims against it.78 Second, the
auditor must "examine documents in the client's possession concerning

in assets and 500 or more owners of any class of equity securities must file periodic reports
with the SEC, even if their securities are not traded on a national securities exchange. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g-1 (2002).
75
EVIDENTIAL MATTER, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 31, qg 3-8 (American Inst.
of Certified Pub. Accountants 1980).
76
INQUIRY OF A CLIENT'S LAWYER CONCERNING LrTlG., CLAIMS, AND AssESsMENTS,
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 12, %.l
1-2 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1976). Statements on Auditing Standards reflect the AICPA's interpretations of GAAS. The
AICPA has delegated the responsibility for developing and approving such standards to the
Auditing Standards Board ("ASB"). The ASB develops and approves standards that AICPA
members must follow in audits. HERwrrZ & BARRETt, supra note *, at 217.
77 Id.
78
Id.

5(b).
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litigation." 79 Along these same lines, the auditor must review board minutes,
contracts, loan agreements, and other related documents that might disclose
litigation.8 0 Finally, the auditor must ask the client to send an "audit inquiry
letter" to the client's lawyer, requesting information about asserted and specified
unasserted claims against the client.8' The client typically requests the lawyer to
82
provide information about litigation, claims, and assessments to the auditor.
2. Audit Workpapers
With the exception of the audit inquiry letter sent to the client's lawyer, the
form and content of the documentation that the auditor obtains and prepares
regarding any litigation contingencies will vary from audit to audit. The auditor
uses "workpapers," sometimes called "working papers," to document audit
procedures and conclusions. The term "working papers" refers to "records kept
by the auditor of the procedures applied, the tests performed, the information
83
obtained, and the pertinent conclusions reached in the engagement.
Accordingly, workpapers may include "audit programs, analyses, memoranda,
letters of confirmation and representation, abstracts of company documents, and
schedules or commentaries prepared or obtained by the auditor."'84
Among other things, the workpapers contain the auditor's evaluation of the
adequacy and reasonableness of the client's treatment of litigation contingencies
in the financial statements and related notes. At a minimum, the working papers
will contain management's listing of any lawsuits that the client has determined
meet the requirements for disclosure or accrual under SFAS No. 5 and the
lawyer's response to the audit inquiry letter.85 In addition, the working papers
often contain supporting documentation gathered by management, the auditor, or
both. Because the auditor must assess management's conclusions regarding the
appropriate financial accounting treatment of litigation contingencies under
SFAS No. 5, the auditor's workpapers may contain information concerning
management's determinations of the probability of unfavorable outcomes and its

79

80

l

5(c).

1d

7(a)-(d). Auditors typically undertake this procedure for various other reasons in

an audit.
81
Id
82

6,8.

INQUIRY OF A CLIENT'S LAWYER CONCERNING LITIG., CLAIMS, AND ASSESSMENTS,

supra note 76, 1g 6, 8.
83
WORKING PAPERS, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 41, 1 3 (American Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 1982).
84 Id

85 See id.n 4, 5(b).

1050

OHIOSTATE LAWJOURIAL

[Vol. 63:1017

estimates of any potential losses.8 6 Of course, the lawyer's opinions and
conclusions often influence management's assessments and the auditor's
evaluation. Thus, the workpapers might also include discussion or notation
regarding the weight that the auditor and management accorded to the lawyer's
opinions.
3. Public OversightBoard
In 1977, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA")
formed the SEC Practice Section ("SECPS") as part of the Institute's Division
for CPA Firms and established the Public Oversight Board ("POB"), a
five-member, autonomous body, to oversee the SECPS. In that capacity and until
May 1, 2002,87 the POB monitored the quality control programs that the public
accounting firms that audit publicly held enterprises had implemented. Every
three years, the POB required SECPS members to submit their practices to peer
review by other accountants. In addition, the POB studied litigation against
member firms alleging audit failures involving publicly traded enterprises to
determine whether those firms needed to take corrective actions to strengthen
their quality control systems or to address personnel deficiencies. The POB
required SECPS members to report litigation and send copies of complaints
within thirty days.
After such a report, the Quality Control Inquiry Committee ("QCIC")
investigated the complaint. Where appropriate, the QCIC referred the matter to
the AICPA Professional Ethics Division for potential disciplinary action. In cases
involving alleged audit failures, the files and staff of the QCIC and the AICPA
Professional Ethics Division may provide information related to the underlying
litigation.
86

See id. 3.

87 Following the collapse of Enron Corp., the SEC developed a plan to overhaul oversight
of the accounting profession. Michael Schroeder, SEC Proposes Accounting Disciplinary
Body, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2002, at Cl. The plan proposed a new organization to oversee
disciplinary reviews of accountants, replacing the POB's disciplinary functions. Id. In protest to
the SEC's plan, the POB voted to disband on January 20, 2002, and subsequently terminated
its existence on May 1, 2002. PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., FINAL ANNUAL REPORT 2001 (2002),
http://www.publicoversightboard.org/2001.pdf. Noting that a large minority of the proposed
board's members would come from the accounting profession, the POB determined that the
SEC's plan would actually hurt the effectiveness of independent oversight, giving the
accounting profession more control. Scot J. Paltrow & Jonathan Weil, Accounting Industry
Review Board Votes to End Its Existence in Protest, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at A2. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, establishes a five-member
oversight board, only two members of which can be or have been certified public accountants.
Id § 101(e), 116 Stat. at 751. See supra note 18.
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C. Responses to Audit Inquiries
An enterprise's auditors and lawyers view accruals arising from, and
disclosures related to, litigation contingencies quite differently. The enterprise's
auditors generally want to encourage as much disclosure as possible, or even
adequate accruals, to ensure that the financial statements do not understate or
overlook material liabilities. In the absence of an accrual, the auditor wants the
financial statements to disclose as much information as possible about a material
contingent liability to communicate all relevant information to the users of
financial statements. In addition, the auditor wants to gather as much information
as possible to support the enterprise's treatment of contingent liabilities.
Disclosure and documentation help to protect the auditor from liability if the
client experiences future financial problems. Lawyers, on the other hand, strive
to protect the attorney-client privilege. These goals conflict, because a lawyer's
disclosure of information to auditors can waive the attorney-client privilege. An
attorney, however, cannot simply avoid the issues arising from audit inquiry
letters by refusing to respond. Failing to reply to an audit inquiry letter can
prevent the auditor from issuing an unqualified opinion. As a result, lawyers
must exercise great care in responding to these audit inquiry letters.
In December 1975, the American Bar Association (the "ABA") issued a
Statement of Policy to set forth the legal profession's official policy on responses
to audit inquiry letters.8 8 The ABA designed the Statement of Policy (the "ABA
Statement of Policy") to address the dual concerns that a lawyer's disclosure of
some confidential information to an outside auditor may waive the attorneyclient privilege, at the same time that non-disclosure could prevent the auditor
from issuing an unqualified opinion.8 9 The ABA feared that these concerns
would discourage clients, especially corporations, from discussing potential legal
problems with their lawyers. 90 The Commentary that accompanied the ABA
Statement of Policy explicitly sets forth the ABA's expectation that
88 A.B.A., Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requestsfor
Information, 31 BUS. LAW. 1709, 1709 (1976) [hereinafter A.B.A., Statement of Policy]. The
American Bar Association's Section of Business Law has compiled, and occasionally updates,
the "principal official pronouncements and unofficial commentaries [discussing] audit inquiries
and lawyers' responses." COMM. ON AuDrr INQUIRY RESPONSES, A.B.A., AUDrTOR'S LETIER

HANDBOOK 1 (1990). In addition, The Business Lawyer, the Section of Business Law's
quarterly publication, periodically contains articles which discuss developments in this area.
See, e.g., Subcomm. on Audit Inquiry Responses, A.B.A., Inquiry of a Client's Lawyer
Concerning Litigation, Claims, and Assessments: Auditing InterpretationAU Section 337, 45
BUS. LAw. 2245 (1990); James J. Fuld, Lawyers' Responses to Auditors-Some Practical
Aspects, 44 Bus. LAw. 159 (1988).
89 See A.B.A., Statement of Policy, supra note 88, at 1709-10.
90 Id.
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communications between lawyers and auditors in accordance with the Statement
of Policy would not prove prejudicial to clients engaged in, or facing, adversary

proceedings. 9' In addition, the Commentary specifically recognized that if
developments occur to negate this expectation, the ABA may need to review and

92
revise the Statement of Policy.
To encourage future attorney-client communications, to provide maximum
protection to such communications, and to seek to assure confidentiality to
corporate clients, the ABA Statement of Policy addresses several issues
regarding the lawyer's response, including client consent, the scope of
permissible use, general limits on the scope of response, and specific limits
regarding materiality, types of contingencies, and evaluation of claims. In
addition, the ABA Statement of Policy establishes certain suggested parameters
for the lawyer's response.

1. Client Consent
Recognized professional responsibilities and ethical considerations require a
lawyer to preserve a client's confidences and secrets. 93 At the time of the ABA
Statement of Policy, the ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the
"MCPR") defined client confidences as information that the attomey-client
privilege protected.94 The MCPR defined client secrets as information gained
during the professional relationship between the lawyer and the client that the
client requested the lawyer to hold in confidence or that would embarrass or

otherwise harm the client if revealed. 95 Because any disclosure related to a
particular subject matter may effectively waive any privilege with respect to
91 Id at 1717.
92 Id
93 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980). The ABA adopted the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility ("MCPR") in 1969. In1977, two years after approving the
ABA Statement of Policy, the ABA formed a committee to evaluate the MCPR and to write
the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"). Like the MCPR, the Model
Rules require a lawyer to maintain client confidentiality. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(2001).
94
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPoNSiBLflY DR 4-101(A) (1980). Courts have long
recognized that a corporation can claim the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981) (expanding the corporate attorney-client privilege
to low- and mid-level employees when the corporation must defend against litigation); see also
Newport Pac., Inc. v. County of San Diego, 200 F.R.D. 628, 630-31 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (stating
that "[tihere is no longer any question that the attorney-client privilege may be asserted by a
corporation"); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege is available to a corporation).
95 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSBIBIY DR 4-101 (A) (1980).
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related communications, a lawyer should carefully evaluate and discuss with the
client the legal consequences of disclosure to an independent auditor.96 To
address the issue of the lawyer's ethical obligation to preserve client
confidentiality, the ABA Statement of Policy lists four criteria that a lawyer
should employ to ensure client consent to the disclosures.
First, an agent of the client with the authority to render such a request must
sign the initial letter requesting that the lawyer prepare the audit inquiry
response. 97 If the requested information will not disclose a confidence or secret
and does not require the lawyer to evaluate the merits of a claim,98 the lawyer
may then provide the information to the auditor without further consent.99
Second, the ABA Statement of Policy notes that the initial request letter that
the client sends to the lawyer generally does not supply the consent necessary to
disclose a confidence or secret or to evaluate a claim. The client or an authorized
agent can only consent to such a disclosure after the lawyer has fully informed
the client about the resulting legal consequences.100 Third, the ABA Statement of
Policy cautions that lawyers should remember that an adverse party might assert
10 1
that any evaluation of potential liability constitutes an admission.
Finally, to secure the client's full consent, the ABA Statement of Policy
advises the lawyer to ask the client to review and approve the lawyer's response
to the audit inquiry letter before the lawyer transmits the response to the
auditor.10 2 The ABA Statement of Policy also notes that the lawyer should
provide additional explanation and advice to the client so that the client fully
understands the legal consequences of any disclosure. 10 3 Such a procedure seeks
to enable the client to compare the costs of potentially waiving the attorney-client
privilege against the benefits of an unqualified opinion from the auditor.
2. Limits on Permissible Use
Unless the lawyer states otherwise, only the auditor can use the lawyer's
response and only in connection with the audit. 1 4 In particular, the client should
not quote or refer to the letter in the client's financial statements or any
96 See infra notes 235-55 and accompanying text.
97 A.B.A., Statement of Policy, supra note 88, at 1711.
98 The work product doctrine may, or may not, protect such an evaluation. See infra notes
265-320 and accompanying text.
99 A.B.A., Statement of Policy, supranote 88, at 1711.
10 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103

1d.

104 Ma at 1715.
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accompanying notes or file the letter with any governmental agency or other
person without the lawyer's prior written consent. 10 5 Either action would almost
certainly waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to related information. If
the auditor gives the lawyer advance written notice, the ABA Statement of Policy
acknowledges that the auditor may furnish the lawyer's response to comply with
10 6
a court order or to defend against a malpractice charge arising from the audit.
3. General Limitations on the Scope of the Response
In addition to the specific limits on materiality, types of contingencies, and
evaluation of claims discussed in the following sections, the ABA Statement of
Policy also contemplates three general limitations on the scope of the lawyer's
response. These general limitations seek to prevent the unnecessary disclosure of
information that may waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to any
related information. Whenever a lawyer or law firm so limits the response to an
107
audit inquiry letter, the response should communicate such limits.
First, the lawyer should set forth in the response, by way of limitation, the
scope of the legal engagement.10 8 In addition, unless the lawyer's response
indicates otherwise, the lawyer should limit the response to matters for which the
lawyer devoted substantive attention through either legal representation or
consultation since the beginning of the period or periods undergoing audit.10 9
Second, the ABA Statement of Policy advises the lawyer both to indicate the
date as of which the response furnishes information and to disclaim any
obligation to advise the auditor about any changes in that information that might
come to the lawyer's attention after such date. I 10

105 A.B.A., Statement of Policy, supra note 88, at 1715.

106 Id.
107 Id at 1712. The ABA Statement of Policy contemplates that the attorney can use the
following statement in the response to incorporate by reference these limitations:
This response is limited by, and in accordance with, the ABA Statement of Policy
Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information (December 1975);
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the limitations set forth in such Statement
on the scope and use of this response (Paragraphs 2 and 7) are specifically incorporated
herein by reference, and any description herein of any 'loss contingencies' is qualified in
its entirety by Paragraph 5 of the Statement and the accompanying Commentary (which is
an integral part of the Statement).
ld at 1715.

108 Id at 1711
109 Idat 1711.
110 Id
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Third, the ABA Statement of Policy states that when a law firm or law
department responds to the audit inquiry, the auditor may assume that the firm or
department has attempted to determine, from lawyers currently in the firm or
department, and who performed legal services during the relevant financial
accounting period or periods, whether those services constituted substantive legal
attention. 1 The auditor may not assume, however, that the law firm or
department has reviewed any of the client's transactions or other matters to
identify any loss contingencies that the client has not identified. 112 In other
words, the lawyer does not need to search the company's files for unknown loss
contingencies when preparing the audit inquiry response. If the lawyer
recognizes unasserted possible claims or assessments in the course of providing
regular legal services, the ABA Statement of Policy does not automatically
require the lawyer to disclose those unasserted claims or assessments to the
auditor. Rather, a lawyer's professional obligations require the lawyer to call
those matters to the client's attention and to advise the client about any
1 13
disclosures that the lawyer considers required or desirable.
4. Materiality
In addition to the general limitations on the response, the lawyer may further
limit the disclosures in the response to contingencies that satisfy a specified
materiality threshold. In other words, the lawyer may optionally indicate that the
response limits the disclosure of loss contingencies to items that the lawyer
considers, either individually or collectively, material to the client's financial
statements. 114 In assessing what constitutes a material contingency, the lawyer
could first quantify each item and then select, and apply, a test. 115 Tests to
determine materiality could include: (1) matters involving an amount in excess of
a certain dollar amount; (2) matters containing a maximum potential loss
exceeding a certain amount; (3) matters the expected effects of which would
exceed a certain amount; or (4) claims exceeding a certain amount. 116 The fourth
1

1 12

A.B.A., Statement ofPolicy, supra note 88, at 1711.
Id.; see also A.B.A., Introductory Analysis and Guides to Statement of Policy

Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information-Preparedby the
Committee on Audit Inquiry Responses, 31 BUS. LAw. 1737, 1739 (1976) (stating that the
lawyer's obligation to consult with the client regarding unasserted claims does not require the
lawyer to go out of the way to search for or develop facts regarding possible claims other than

those that are apparent through the lawyer's legal work for the client).
113 A.B.A., supra note 112, at 1739.
114 A.B.A., Statement of Policy, supra note 88, at 1712.
115 Fuld, supranote 88, at 159.
116 Id. at 159-60.
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test, while easily determinable, presents practical problems because some claims
117
involve enormous claims for punitive damages.
To avoid quantifying each loss contingency, a lawyer could alternatively
develop a test for materiality that does not require a specific quantification. For
example, a response could address only those "matters which may materially
affect the financial condition of the company." 1 8 For this particular test,
however, the lawyer must determine what "materially affect" means. That
standard may include a percentage of net worth, a percentage of total liabilities,
or some other similar test. No matter what standard the lawyer chooses to use to
determine materiality, the lawyer should indicate that standard in the response. In
addition, the lawyer should explicitly state that the response only addresses
contingencies that meet or exceed that standard. 119
5. Types of Contingencies
In the response to the audit inquiry letter, the lawyer should limit the
response to three types of loss contingencies: overtly threatened or pending
litigation; contractually assumed obligations; and unasserted possible claims or
assessments. 120
The lawyer should address overtly threatened or pending litigation, even if
the client has not specified such matters in the request for information, whenever
a potential claimant has indicated an awareness of and intention to assert a
possible claim or assessment. 12 1 In the case of overtly threatened or pending
litigation, the lawyer should further limit the response to possible claims or
assessments for which the lawyer considers the likelihood of avoiding litigation
' 122
or settlement as "remote."
By comparison, the lawyer should address unasserted possible claims or
assessments in the response to an audit inquiry letter only when the client has
identified and asked the lawyer to comment on each specific unasserted possible
claim or assessment. 123 The lawyer should advise the client to request disclosure
about unasserted possible claims or assessments only if the following three
conditions apply: the client has determined that the claimant will probably assert
a claim; the client considers the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome as at least
reasonably possible; and any resulting loss would materially affect the client's
117 Id. at 160.
118 Id
119

Id.
120 A.B.A., Statement of Policy, supranote 88, at 1712.
121Id
122 Id
123 Id
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financial condition. 124 Unasserted possible claims or assessments include
catastrophes, accidents, or other similar occurrences in which the circumstances
openly and notoriously suggest the client's potential liability; government
investigations in which the authorities have instituted, or almost certainly will
institute, enforcement proceedings, and where the client would normally expect
private claims to remedy the situation; and other circumstances in which the
client's public disclosures acknowledge the existence of one or more probable
claims arising from a specific event or occurrence. 125 In this regard, however, the
lawyer should not confirm to the auditor the completeness of the client's list of
126
unasserted claims or assessments.
6. Specific Recommendations Regarding Disclosures
According to the ABA Statement of Policy, the lawyer should limit the
information provided to the auditor to an identification of the matter, the stage of
the proceedings, the claims that litigation opponents or other third parties have
asserted, and the client's stated position regarding the claims. 127 More
importantly, the ABA Statement of Policy recommends that the lawyer not
express an opinion as to the possibility of an unfavorable outcome or as to the
12 8
amount of expected damages.
a. Possibilityof Unfavorable Outcome
The ABA Statement of Policy recommends that the lawyer almost never
express a judgment to the auditor regarding the possibility of an unfavorable
outcome. 129 The ABA Statement further emphasizes that the absence of such a
judgment does not necessarily indicate that the lawyer expects an unfavorable
outcome. 130 When a lawyer deems an unfavorable outcome as either "probable"
or "remote," however, the lawyer may express that judgment to the outside
124 Id
125 Id at 1712-13.
126
A.B.A.,supra note 112, at 1739. Because the ABA Statement of Policy requires the

lawyer to discuss unasserted claims or assessments only if the client specifically notes and
requests the lawyer to discuss such a claim or assessment, the lawyer's assurance of the
completeness of the client's disclosure could invite claims against the lawyer if either the client
fails to identify an unasserted claim or assessment in the initial request or chooses not to
authorize the lawyer to disclose such a claim or assessment.
127
A.B.A., Statement of Policy, supra note 88, at 1712.
128 ld at 1713-14.
129 ld at 1713.
130 Id.at 1714.
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auditor.13 ' The ABA Statement of Policy describes an unfavorable outcome as
"probable" when "the prospects of the claimant not succeeding are judged to be
extremely doubtful and the prospects for success[ful defense] are judged to be
slight.' 132 At the other end of the spectrum, the ABA Statement of Policy
considers the possibility of an unfavorable outcome as "remote" when "the
prospects for the client['s defense] not succeeding... are judged to be extremely
1 33
doubtful and the prospects of success by the claimant are judged to be slight.
A potentially significant problem regarding lawyers' letters arises because
attorneys and auditors generally apply different standards to determine the
likelihood that a claim will result in a loss. These different standards theoretically
can result in divergent standards for disclosure. 134 Recall that SFAS No. 5
defines a loss as "probable" if the future events confirming the loss are "likely to
occur." 1 35 In addition, SFAS No. 5 classifies a loss contingency as "remote" if
136
the chance of future events confirming the loss are "slight.'
137
The following chart illustrates these different standards:
DIVERGENCE BETWEEN FASB AND ABA PROBABILITY REGIONS
Chances of an Unfavorable Outcome
ABA
inferential
reasonably possible

remote
0%

I
remote

probable

I
I

reasonably
possible

I

100%

probable

FASB
The standards for unasserted claims similarly diverge. An auditor must
determine whether the enterprise has properly treated any unasserted claims. If
the likelihood of assertion is "probable," SFAS No. 5 may require the enterprise
131 Id at 1713-14.
132 Id at 1713 (emphasis added).
133 A.B.A., Statement of Policy, supra note 88, at 1713 (emphasis added).
134 Kenneth E. Harrison & Thomas C. Pearson, Communications Between Auditors and
Lawyers for the Identification and Evaluation of Litigation, Claims, and Assessments, ACCT.
HORIZONS, June 1989, at 76.
135 ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 25,

3a.

136 Id. 3c.
137

Note, Attorney Responses To Audit Letters: The Problem of Disclosing Loss
ContingenciesArising From Litigation and UnassertedClaims, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 838, 877

(1976).
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to accrue, disclose, or both accrue and disclose the claim. 138 Although the
definition in paragraph three of SFAS No. 5 does not expressly apply to this
determination, the term "probable" at least arguably still means "likely to occur."
In contrast, the ABA Statement of Policy considers an unasserted claim
"probable only when the prospects of its being asserted seem reasonably certain
' 39
and the prospects of non-assertion seem slight.'
...
These different definitions and standards can obviously cause problems. For
example, the ABA definition of "probable" could lead lawyers to consider fewer
unasserted claims than auditors, thereby revealing fewer claims. This creates
difficulties for auditors in determining whether to accrue or disclose a claim. The
ABA also has a narrower definition of remote than the FASB, so lawyers may
consider fewer losses remote than auditors. These conflicting standards can leave
clients caught in the middle. Public companies generally need an unqualified
opinion from their auditors for their creditors and shareholders. The client also
14
ultimately bears responsibility for any improper disclosures. 0
When the lawyer determines that the client should disclose an unasserted
contingency based on the criteria in both SFAS No. 5 and the ABA Statement of
Policy, the lawyer must advise the client regarding disclosure to the auditor. The
client, however, retains final responsibility for deciding whether or not to
disclose a particular contingency. In this regard, the lawyer has an obligation not
to participate knowingly in any violations of securities law disclosure
requirements.'14 Under the MCPR, when the lawyer believes that the loss
contingency qualifies as of such material importance and seriousness, and that
there is reason to believe that non-disclosure of the matter would violate
securities law, the lawyer should advise the client to disclose the matter to the
auditor. 142 When the client disregards the lawyer's advice and commits securities
law violations, rules governing professional responsibility may require the lawyer
43
to resign from the client's employment. 1

138 ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note

25, I 8, 10.
139 A.B.A., Statement of Policy, supra note 88, at 1713 (emphasis added).
140 In this regard, the client may face lawsuits from disgruntled shareholders or the SEC if
the company does not properly disclose contingencies. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Sec.
Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 707-13 (3d Cir. 1996) (reinstating class action securities fraud claims
alleging that a $975 million pre-tax accrual for loan losses did not adequately cover estimated
losses); see also supra note 22.
141 A.B.A., Statement of Policy, supra note 88, at 1714.
142 Id.
at 1725.
143 Id,
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b. Estimate of PotentialLoss
As a general rule, the ABA Statement of Policy provides that a lawyer
should not disclose an estimate of potential loss when responding to an audit
inquiry letter. 144 When the client or auditor asks the lawyer to estimate the
potential loss or range of loss for the response, the lawyer should provide that
information only if the probability of an inaccurate estimate is slight. 145 The
ABA Statement of Policy notes that, in most cases, the lawyer will be unable to
sufficiently assess the potential loss or range of loss, and the probability of an
46
inaccurate estimate will be more than slight. 1

1I. THREE SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS AFrER THE 1975 ACCORD AND
RELATED INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION

Ever since the 1975 accord between the accounting and legal professions,
both the business community and the legal academy have generally assumed that
the accord simultaneously protects the confidentiality of lawyer-client
communications and allows the auditing profession to follow standards and
procedures that preserve confidence in the auditing process and audited financial
statements. After the professions reached the 1975 accord, however, a 1980 SEC
administrative release, a 1984 Supreme Court decision, and a provision in the
Tax Reform Act of 1984 have fundamentally changed the legal landscape behind
the accord, with barely any notice from most academics and lawyers.
First, beginning in 1980, the enhanced disclosure rules for Management's
Discussion and Analysis require SEC registrants to disclose certain forwardlooking information, including any "currently known trends, events and
uncertainties" that a registrant reasonably expects will have a material impact on
its liquidity, financial condition or results of operations. 14 7 Because the federal
securities laws use a lower materiality threshold than GAAP, the MD&A
requirements mandate disclosure in situations that may not qualify as material for
financial accounting purposes. 14 8 Second, in United States v. Arthur Young &
Co., 14 9 the Supreme Court held that the IRS could summons tax accrual
workpapers that the auditing firm Arthur Young prepared to evaluate Amerada
Hess Corp.'s reserves for contingent tax liabilities. In dicta, the Supreme Court
opined that Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would give the
144 'd at 1714.
145 Id
146 Id

147 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2002).
14 8 See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
149

465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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150
SEC or a private plaintiff in securities litigation access to these workpapers.
Third, in the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Congress added the "economic
performance" requirement to § 461(h) of the Internal Revenue Code.15 1 As a
result, enterprises frequently cannot deduct, for tax purposes, accrued expenses
152
that affect their financial statements until they actually pay the related liability.
Collectively, these developments provide additional discovery opportunities.
First, a litigator should carefully review an opponent's MD&As in any public
filings after the incident that gave rise to the underlying litigation. In appropriate
cases, the litigator should also seek to discover the audit workpapers and other
relevant information from the opponent's auditor. Finally, an opponent's federal
income tax returns, especially Schedule M-1, may provide helpful information
about any litigation reserves.

A. Management's DiscussionandAnalysis
The federal securities laws require any enterprise proposing to offer
securities to the public, sometimes referred to as "issuers," to disclose certain
information and to file financial statements with the SEC. 153 In addition, socalled "registrants," which include most of the country's largest corporations,
such as Menill Lynch and Disney, specifically those companies whose shares are
listed on a national securities exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange
or The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., or which meet certain tests relating to total
assets and number of shareholders, must file periodic reports and financial
154
statements with the SEC to provide information to the investing public.
Collectively, these initial and continuing disclosure obligations seek to prevent
misleading or incomplete financial reporting and to enable investors to reach
55
informed decisions. 1

150 See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.

151 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 91(a), (g), 98 Stat. 494, 598600, 608 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 461(h) (2000)).
152

See infra notes 185-205 and accompanying text.

153 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 2(4), 48 Stat. 74, 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2000)).
154 See supra note 73.
155 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure:A BehavioralAnalysis,
68 U. CIN. L. REv. 1023, 1024 (2000) (describing Congress's desire to "'substitute a

philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor"' and listing various legal
requirements and authorities) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.

180, 186 (1963)); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 9-16 (reviewing the mandatory disclosure system before offering a
critique of its premises).

1062

OHIOSTATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1017

Under the integrated disclosure requirements, which the SEC adopted in
1980,156 Regulation S-K provides standard instructions for most enterprises
filing forms under the federal securities laws. 157 Items 103 and 303 of Regulation
S-K require both issuers and registrants to disclose information related to
litigation contingencies. 158 By carefully reviewing these disclosures, a reader
may learn information regarding such contingencies that does not appear in the
notes to the accompanying financial statements.
Item 103 requires such enterprises to describe briefly any pending and
material legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the
business, when the underlying pleadings name the enterprise or any subsidiary as
a party or list any property of either the enterprise or any subsidiary as the
subject. 159 The description must include the court or agency before which the
proceedings are pending, the date instituted, the principal parties, the factual
basis alleged to underlie the proceedings, and the relief sought.' 60 Subject to an
important exception for environmental proceedings, however, an enterprise need
not disclose any information regarding any proceeding that involves primarily a
claim for damages if the amount at issue, excluding interest and costs, does not
exceed ten percent of the enterprise's consolidated current assets. In computing
such percentages, the enterprise must include the amount involved in any other
pending or known contemplated proceeding that presents in large degree the
same legal and factual issues. 16 1 A special rule, however, applies to
environmental litigation. Enterprises must disclose information about
environmental litigation if the amount at issue exceeds $100,000.162
156

The rules apply to both filings under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
157 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.915 (2002). Regulation S-K applies to both enterprises desiring
to offer securities to the public and to registrants which must file periodic reports with the SEC.

Regulation S-B contains similar requirements for small business issuers, which have revenues
and public floats that fall below $25 million. 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10-.702 (2002).
158 In addition, the notes to the financial statements may contain additional disclosures
about contingencies related to litigation. See supra notes 54-58, 73 and accompanying text.
159 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2002). Item 103 requires enterprises to disclose information
about threatened proceedings only when the enterprise knows that governmental authorities are
contemplating such proceedings. Id.
16 0

Id. at instruction 2 (requiring no disclosure where claim for damages does not exceed
ten percent of current assets).
161 Id.

16 2 Although the SEC has required disclosures similar to those found in MD&A since

1968, the framework for the current rules dates back to 1980. See Concept Release on
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Operations, Securities Act
Release No. 6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 13,716 (Apr. 24, 1987); see also Amendments to
Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations, and Guides; Integration of Securities

2002]

OPPORTUNITIES

1063

Item 303 requires an issuer or registrant to discuss its liquidity, capital
resources, operating results, and other information necessary to understand the
financial statements. As such, MD&A mandates disclosure of both historical and
certain forward-looking information, including any "currently known trends,
events, and uncertainties" that the registrant reasonably expects will have a
material impact on its liquidity, financial condition, or operating results. 163 Such
historical and prospective disclosures enable investors and other users to assess
not only the registrant's financial condition and operating results, but also its
prospects for the future. Because a numerical presentation and brief
accompanying footnotes rarely allow an investor "to judge the quality of
earnings and the likelihood that past performance is indicative of future
performance," 164 MD&A provides the reader an opportunity to look at the
registrant "through the eyes of management" by supplying both a short and longterm perspective. In Financial Reporting Release No. 36 ("FRR No. 36"),165 the
SEC established a "reasonably likely to have a material effect" standard for
disclosing forward-looking information and specifically applied that standard to
66
an environmental contingency.]
Item 303(a) requires additional disclosures when the financial statements do
not indicate future operating results or financial condition. The third instruction
directs that the discussion should focus specifically on any material events and
uncertainties that would cause future operating results to deviate from reported
financial information, 167 which the SEC has referred to as affecting the quality of
earnings. In a recent consent order resolving public administrative proceedings
against a registrant, its former chairman, and several affiliates, the SEC has stated
that "Item 303(a) requires that management address any issues which impact the
quality of earnings."168 Without such an explanation, an investor could not judge

Act Disclosure Systems, Securities Act Release No. 6231, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 25,
1980).
163 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2002).
164 Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 54
Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,428 (May 24, 1989) (emphasis added).
165 l
166 Id.

167 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2002).
168 In re Terex Corp., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1126, [19992001 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 74,633, at 63,106 (Apr. 20, 1999) (emphasis added).
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the quality of earnings and the likelihood that reported financial information
16 9
would not indicate future operating results.
MD&A requires additional information in at least two ways. First, the
narrative explanation often provides details not found in the numerical
presentation or footnotes accompanying the financial statements. Second, the
enhanced disclosure requirements seemingly establish a lower materiality
threshold than found in financial statements under GAAP.1 70 As a general rule,
accountants and auditors generally treat any amount which does not exceed five
percent of income before taxes as immaterial. On the other side, auditors usually

consider any item which exceeds ten percent of income before taxes as
material. 17 1 Although neither the SEC nor the courts have explicitly established a
materiality standard for MD&A, they have rejected mathematical standards,
preferring a facts and circumstances analysis. 172 Under the federal securities
169

Id.; see also In re Bank of Boston Corp., 60 U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm'n, SEC

Docket 2695, 1995 SEC LEXIS 3456 (Dec. 22, 1995) (involving the failure to disclose known
trends and uncertainties in the bank's real estate portfolio that would reasonably be expected to
have a material unfavorable impact on the bank's financial condition).
170
See Bean & Thomas, supra note 31, at 120. To the extent that the "reasonably likely to
have a material effect" standard in the MD&A requirements mandates disclosure in situations
that do not qualify as "material" for accounting purposes, compliance with GAAP may not
satisfy disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws.
171 Id.; see also Charles Jordan et al., MaterialityforExtraordinaryItems, 35 NAT'L PUB.
AcCr., Dec. 1990, at 42, 43 (listing other mathematical guidelines for average net income, total
revenues, total assets, and owners' equity).
172 Compare Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (vacating in part,
reversing in part, and remanding for further consideration a district court decision that granted
defendants' motion to dismiss after the district could held that the alleged misrepresentations of
certain fees qualified as immaterial as a matter of law when the fees amounted to only 1.7
percent of the defendant company's total revenues), with In re Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. 99 C 6853, 2000 WL 1705279, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2000) (granting defendants'
motion to dismiss when the alleged $40 million dollars in undisclosed expenses constituted less
than ten percent of the company's before-tax income during the relevant period).
One recent example may illustrate how a quantitatively immaterial item might
nevertheless qualify as material. An October 1998 Wall Street Journal article describes
BankAmerica Corp.'s failure to disclose information about its $372 million write-down of a
loan to D.E. Shaw & Co., a New York investment firm. Even though bank officials knew about
possible losses on the loan as early as August, the bank did not disclose the extent of the losses
before shareholders voted in late September to approve a $43 billion dollar merger with
NationsBank, which created the nation's second-largest bank. The article quotes the merged
bank's chief financial officer as saying that "'[$372 million is] a big number but it's not
material to a company' that is as big as BankAmerica." Rick Brooks & Mitchell Pacelle,
BankAmerica Knew in August of Trading Woes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1998, at A3. When the
merged bank announced the write-down in mid-October, the stock price dropped eleven
percent in a single day. Plaintiffs quickly filed multiple class action securities fraud actions
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laws, the Supreme Court has concluded that an omitted fact qualifies as material
if a substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable investor would have considered
the omitted fact important because disclosure would have significantly altered
173
the "total mix" of available information.
As a result, the financial accounting rules and the MD&A requirements may
establish different standards. If the MD&A rules in fact impose a lower standard
related to the merger against new BankAmerica and other defendants. See In re BankAmerica
Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (discussing facts and granting in part
and denying in part defendants' motion to dismiss); see also Brooks & Pacelle, supra.
In Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, the SEC's staff explicitly rejected the automatic
classification of financial statement misstatements or omissions that fall under a five percent
threshold as immaterial, absent particularly egregious circumstances, such as misappropriation
by senior management. The staff emphasized that registrants and their auditors must consider
qualitative factors in materiality determinations. For example, a quantitatively small
misstatement or omission could nevertheless qualify as material when it:
*
*
*
*
*
"
"
*
•

arises from an item capable of precise measurement;
masks a change in earnings or other trends;
hides a failure to meet analysts' consensus expectations for the enterprise;
changes a loss into income or vice versa;
concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant's business that has been
identified as playing a significant role in the registrant's operations or profitability;
determines the registrant's compliance with regulatory requirements;
affects the registrant's compliance with loan covenants or other contractual
requirements;
increases management's compensation-for example, by satisfying a requirement for
the award of bonuses or other forms of incentive compensation; or
involves concealment of an unlawful transaction.

In assessing multiple misstatements, the bulletin reminds registrants and auditors that they must
consider all misstatements or omissions both separately and in the aggregate to determine
whether, in relation to the individual line item amounts, subtotals, or totals in the financial
statements, the misstatements or omissions materially misstate the financial statements taken as
a whole. Finally, the SAB reminds registrants that immaterial, but intentional misstatements
can violate the federal securities laws. Materiality, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed.
Reg. 45,150, 45,153-54 (Aug. 19, 1999), reprintedin 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 75,501, at
64,219-3 (Sept. 6, 2000); see also Kenneth C. Fang & Brad Jacobs, Clarifying and Protecting
MaterialityStandardsin FinancialStatements: A Review of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99,
55 Bus. LAW. 1039 (2000) (tracing the development of materiality standards, examining the
purpose and reasoning behind SAB No. 99's release, and concluding that the bulletin creates
an ambiguous standard that opens the door to liability for innocent mistakes in judgment).
173 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (interpreting Rule 10b-5); TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976) (proxy rules); see also 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.405, 240.12b-2 (2002) ("he term 'material,' when used to qualify a requirement for
the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters
to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in
determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered.").
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for disclosure, an issuer or registrant could theoretically observe GAAP but still
violate the federal securities laws.1 74 In the process, a lawyer advising the
registrant about disclosure obligations under the securities laws could
conceivably commit professional malpractice. For this reason, issues about
whether or how to disclose information about contingencies frequently perplex
securities lawyers, particularly given the SEC's recent emphasis on the MD&A
requirements.
Second, does the "reasonably likely" standard for MD&A purposes differ
from the "reasonably possible" likelihood which would otherwise require
disclosure under SFAS No. 5? In Greenstone v. Cambex Corp.,175 the First
Circuit-in an opinion that then Chief Judge, now Justice, Breyer authoredexplicitly recognized, but did not decide, the issue. In the opinion's last
paragraph, the court observed:
We need not ... decide whether the appropriate standard is knowledge (1)
that an IBM Credit lawsuit was 'probable" or (2) that the lawsuit (or some
similar loss) was '"easonably likely[."] Whether the standard is one, or the other
or yet some third similar standard (such as "reasonably expects"), we should
176
reach the same result.
In the years ahead, we can expect lawyers and the courts to face this potentially
important issue.
Failing to comply with Item 303 could cause the SEC to initiate cease and
desist proceedings. To date, however, no reported decision has imposed liability
under a private cause of action for an Item 303 violation. 177 In any event, if an
174

See, e.g., In re Caterpillar, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No.

363, [1991-1995 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 73,830, at 63,055 (Mar. 31, 1992).
175 975 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1992). Inthat case, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision dismissing a securities fraud claim because the investor did not plead "with
particularity" any specific factual allegations supporting the conclusion that Cambex or its
officers knew that the company faced a significant possibility of loss arising from certain IBM
Credit leases prior to the time that IBM Credit filed the lawsuit.
176 Id at28.
177 See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1419 n.7 (3d Cir.
1997) ("It
isan open issue whether violations of Item 303 create an independent cause of
action for private plaintiffs."); In re Canandaigua Sec. Litig., 944 F.Supp. 1202, 1209 n.4
(S.D.N.Y.1996) ("It isfar from certain that the requirement that there be a duty to disclose
under Rule 1Ob-5 may be satisfied by importing the disclosure duties from S-K 303."); Alfus v.
Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 608 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (concluding that plaintiff must
show a separate duty to disclose, apart from Item 303, before a violation of Rule 1Ob-5 exists);
see also Brian Neach, Note, Item 303's Role in Private Causes of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 741 (2001) (discussing various private causes of
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opponent in litigation must file reports with the SEC, 178 a litigator should
monitor the opponent's periodic filings in an effort to get a quick read of
179
management's outlook on the lawsuit.
B. United States v. Arthur Young & Co.
Until 1984, many accountants and lawyers presumed that third parties, such
as the IRS and private plaintiffs in litigation, could not discover audit
workpapers. In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 180 however, the Supreme
Court reversed that portion of a court of appeals' decision that refused to enforce
an IRS summons as to all Amerada Hess Corp.'s tax accrual workpapers in the
files of its auditor Arthur Young. In so holding, the Supreme Court specifically
rejected the argument that fundamental fairness precludes IRS access to
accountants' tax accrual workpapers as follows:
[I]f the SEC itself, or a private plaintiff in securities litigation, sought to obtain
the tax accrual workpapers at issue in this case, they would surely be entitled to
do so.... [N]o sound reason exists for conferring lesser authority upon the IRS
than upon a private litigant suing with regard to transactions concerning which
181
the public has no interest
In the related footnote sixteen, the Supreme Court opined that Rule 26(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would give the SEC or a private plaintiff in
action that can implicate Item 303); Suzanne J. Romajas, Note, The Duty to Disclose ForwardLooking Information: A Look at the Future of MD&A, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S245, S256

(1993) (Survey Issue).
178 See supra notes 154-70 and accompanying text.
179 Companies must file reports with the SEC, and in some instances send those reports
to shareholders, in a number of situations. The SEC requires companies to file annual reports
on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, and Form 8-K to disclose relevant financial
matters. See 17 C.F.R. §§240.13a-1, .13a-11, .13a-13 (2002). In the context of public
offerings, 15 U.S.C. § 77g, Schedule A,Items 25-26 (2000), require registration statements to
include an audited balance sheet and income statement along with footnote disclosures. Finally,

Rule 14a-3 requires companies to send shareholders an annual report prior to any proxy
solicitation that relates to an annual shareholders' meeting. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2002). All
of these filings are available through the SEC's EDGAR database, www.sec.gov/edaux/
searches.htm.
180 465 U.S. 805 (1984). Some scholarship discusses other aspects of the Arthur Young
decision. See generally A.A. Sommer, Working with Auditors, in SIXTEENTH ANNUAL
INSTItrUm ON SECURmES REGULATION 263 (Stephen J. Friedman et a. eds., 1985); Frank J.
Magill, Jr., Note, The Accountant-Client Work Product Privilege: United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 38 TAX LAW. 457 (1985).

181Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 820 (footnote omitted).
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securities litigation access to these workpapers. 182 In so ruling, the Supreme
Court specifically rejected the "work-product immunity doctrine for tax accrual
workpapers prepared by independent auditors in the course of compliance with
the federal securities laws" that the court of appeals had fashioned. The Arthur
Young decision, and especially the dicta in footnote sixteen, support expansive
discovery of information about litigation reserves and similar accounting-related
information. Perhaps even more significantly, the Supreme Court also
specifically repudiated the court of appeals' holding "that the public interest in
promoting full disclosure to public accountants, and in turn ensuring the integrity
of the securities markets, required protection for the work that such independent
auditors perform for publicly owned companies,"' 183 concluding, at least under
the circumstances in that case, that "[t]his kind of policy choice is best left to the
Legislative Branch."184
After the dicta in Arthur Young, and in the context of the litigation between
Orange and Merrill Lynch, a litigator might ask the following questions: Could
Orange County use information from Merrill Lynch's securities filings to extract
information from Deloitte & Touche, LLP, the company's auditor, about Merrill
Lynch's accruals during discovery? Even if management and the auditor agree
that SFAS No. 5 does not require the registrant to accrue a contingent liability,
could a litigation opponent discover underlying facts which led to, but which
may not entirely support, the auditor's conclusion? Could Orange County
discover the responses of Merrill Lynch's outside counsel to Deloitte &
Touche's audit inquiry letters during the litigation? Could Orange County use
any information produced to uncover other relevant facts or to gather insights
about Merrill Lynch's litigating strategy? Could Merrill Lynch protect any
information about or supporting its contingencies under the attorney-client or
182

ld at n.16 ("See, e.g... Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1) (parties may obtain discovery

of 'any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action.')"). Remarkably, no reported decision after Arthur Young has cited footnote sixteen.
Only one case, In re GHR Cos., 41 B.R. 655 (Bankr. Mass. 1984), has quoted the language
referred to in the text above that precedes footnote sixteen. In that case, GHR's creditors sought
to discover certain documents from GHR and its accountants for the years preceding GHR's
bankruptcy. Those documents included so-called Matters for Attention of Partners that detailed
information that the audit staff believed warranted a partner's decision, audit strategy
documentation, audit workpapers, internal control questionnaires, and tax workpapers. The
creditors believed that given the magnitude of IRS claims involved in GHR's bankruptcy, they
needed to determine GHR's tax liability to develop a disclosure statement and plan of
reorganization and to determine whether they should appoint a trustee. GHR and its auditors
argued that the work product doctrine protected those documents. In rejecting that argument,
the court cited Arthur Young, quoting the language that precedes footnote sixteen. Id at 66163.
183 Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 810.
184 Id at 821.
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accountant-client privileges? Does the work product doctrine exempt such
information from discovery?
C. "Economic Performance" Requirement
As a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, sometimes more broadly referred
to as the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,185 the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code") 186 now precludes an enterprise from claiming a deduction on its federal
income tax return for accrued expenses related to certain contingencies that
otherwise reduce net income or loss for financial accounting purposes until the
enterprise actually pays the corresponding liability. 187 Under SFAS No. 5, recall

that an enterprise must accrue an expense or loss when: (1) the surrounding facts
and circumstances render it "probable" that an asset has been impaired or that the
enterprise has incurred a liability and (2) the enterprise can reasonably estimate
the amount of the loss or expense.' 8 8 In contrast, case law and Treasury
regulations have long prohibited an accrual method taxpayer 89 from deducting
185 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 1(a), 5(a), 98 Stat. 494,494.
186 Unless otherwise stated, all references to the Internal Revenue Code, sometimes

referred to as the "Code," are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, found at 26 U.S.C., as
amended.
187 Even before the Tax Reform Act of 1984, enterprises could not deduct, on their tax
returns, some items that they quite properly treated as accrued expenses for financial
accounting purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239, 239-47
(1987) (holding that taxpayer providing medical benefits to its employees could not deduct an
estimate of its obligation to pay for medical care that its employees or their qualified
dependents had obtained during the final quarter of the 1972 tax year, when the employees had
not reported the claims to the taxpayer before the end of the year).
188
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
189 As a general proposition, an accrual method taxpayer reports income when earned and
deducts expenses when incurred. In contrast, a cash method taxpayer generally reports income
when actually or constructively received and deducts expenses when paid.
As described below, the Code requires certain enterprises to use the accrual method. In
simple terms, multiple owners can conduct a business as either a partnership, corporation, or
limited liability company. Partnerships, including limited partnerships, limited liability
partnerships, and limited liability limited partnerships, do not pay federal income taxes on their
incomes, but pass through any profits or losses to their partners, who must include their
allocable share of the partnership's profit or loss on their tax returns. In contrast, unless a
corporation qualifies as a "small business corporation" under the Code and files a special
election opting into treatment as a subchapter S corporation, the Code treats it as a separate
taxpaying entity, which must file tax returns and pay taxes. Because subchapter C of the Code
sets forth rules for these separate taxpaying entities, this footnote will refer to these
corporations as "subchapter C corporations." Similar to partnerships, subchapter S corporations
generally pass through any profits and losses to their shareholders, who must include their pro
rata share of the S corporation's profit or loss on their tax returns. Under the classification
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an expense for federal income tax purposes until the item satisfies the "all
events" test. 190 Under those regulations, an accrual method taxpayer could only
deduct an accrued expense if: (1) all events had occurred that determined the fact
of the taxpayer's liability for the expense and (2) the taxpayer could determine
19 1
the liability with reasonable accuracy.
In the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Congress not only explicitly incorporated
the "all events" test into the Code, 192 but also added an "economic performance"
requirement to that test, both effective July 18, 1984.193 As a result, Code § 461
now provides that an accrual method taxpayer meets the "all events" test when
"all events have occurred which determine the fact of liability and the amount of
such liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy."' 194 In addition, the
Code states that "in determining whether an amount has been incurred with
respect to any item during any taxable year, the all events test shall not be treated

regulations, a limited liability company with more than one owner, or member, can generally
qualify for either partnership or corporate tax treatment. Desiring to avoid the corporate income
tax, however, most limited liability companies with more than one member prefer partnership
tax treatment. If a multi-member limited liability company elects corporate tax treatment and
qualifies as a "small business corporation," the limited liability company can file a subchapter S
election.
The Code generally requires both (i) subchapter C corporations and (ii) partnerships with a
subchapter C corporation as a partner to use the accrual method. I.R.C. § 448(a) (2000). Special
exceptions, however, apply for qualified personal service corporations and any corporation or
partnership that meets a $5 million gross receipts test. I.R.C. § 448(b)(2)-(3) (2000). Unless the
Code treats the partnership as a "tax shelter," a partnership without a subchapter C corporation
as a partner can use the cash method. I.R.C. § 448(a)(3) (2000). Similarly, if the Code treats a
subchapter S corporation as a 'tax shelter," the S corporation cannot use the cash method. Id.
190 In United States v. Hughes Properties,Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 600 (1986), the Supreme
Court commented that the "all events" test originated in United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S.
422, 441 (1926). See Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. at 242. Later, the Treasury Department
embodied the test in Treasury Regulation § 1.461 -1(a)(2). Id at 243.
191 See Hughes Props., Inc., 476 U.S. at 600 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)); see
also Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1999).
192 Strictly speaking, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 amended the Internal Revenue Code of

1954, as previously amended. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 5(b), 98
Stat. 494, 494.
193 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 91(a), (g), 98 Stat. 494, 598-

600, 608 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 461(h) (2000)).
194 26 U.S.C. § 461(h)(4) (2000); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in
1999).
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as met any earlier than when economic performance with respect to such item
occurs."

19 5

Section 461 sets forth general principles that govern economic performance
when a liability either: (1) requires the taxpayer to provide property or services,
or (2) arises either from another person supplying services or property to the
taxpayer or from the taxpayer's use of property. 196 Those general principles,
however, specifically do not apply to any "tort liability," defined as an obligation
' 197
that both "requires a payment to another person" and "arises out of any tort."
For a "tort liability" economic performance generally occurs when the taxpayer
pays the other person. 198 In addition, § 461 explicitly authorizes the Secretary of
the Treasury to prescribe regulations that determine when economic performance
occurs as to "any other liability."' 199
The Treasury Regulations state that if a taxpayer's liability arises from "any
tort, breach of contract, or violation of law" and requires a payment to another
2°°
person, economic performance occurs as the taxpayer pays that other person.
195 26 U.S.C. § 461(h)(1) (2000); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4 (as amended in 1999).

Various exceptions in both the Code and Treasury Regulations, however, limit this general
rule. See infra notes 185-205 and accompanying text.
196 I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(A)-(B) (2000).
197 I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(C) (2000).
198 26 U.S.C. § 461(h)(2)(C) (2000). The provision also specifically applies to any
liability that arises under a workers' compensation act. 26 U.S.C. § 461(h)(2)(C)(i) (2000).
Although Code § 461 provides an exception for certain recurring items, the exception
specifically does not apply to "tort liabilities." 26 U.S.C. § 461(h)(3)(C) (2000). In addition, the
Treasury Regulations extend the exclusion from the "recurring item" exception to breaches of
contract and violations of law. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-5(c) (as amended in 1995).
Code § 461(h)(2)(C), however, would presumably not apply to an accrued loss arising
from the taxpayer's writeoff of an asset, such as a receivable or investment, because such an
accrual would not require "a payment to another person." 26 U.S.C. § 461(h)(2)(C) (2000).
'99 I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(D) (2000).
200
Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(2) (as amended in 1999). Economic performance, however,
generally does not occur when the taxpayer makes payments related to a liability to a so-called
"third party," meaning a person other than the person to whom the taxpayer owes the
underlying liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(1)(i) (as amended in 1999). A "third party"
includes a trust, escrow account, court-administered fund, or any similar arrangement.
Several exceptions apply to the general rule that payments to a so-called "third party" do
not qualify as economic performance. In those situations, economic performance generally
occurs as the "third party" makes payments to the person to whom or to which the taxpayer
owes the underlying liability. Id. In such a scenario, the amount of economic performance may
not exceed the amount the taxpayer transferred to the "third party." Id
First, the person to whom or to which the taxpayer owes the liability can validly assign the
right to receive payment to a third party. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(1)(iv) (as amended in 1999).
In addition, operation of law can accomplish the same result. In either event, a payment to the
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Another provision in the Treasury Regulations, which serves as a spillover rule
when no revenue ruling, revenue procedure, or other regulation applies and
20 1
governs so-called "other liabilities," establishes an identical rule.
Under the "economic performance" requirement, therefore, an enterprise
cannot deduct, for tax purposes, any amount related to any accrued, but unpaid,
expense arising from a tort, breach of contract, or violation of law and that will
require payment to another person, until the enterprise actually pays the
corresponding liability. 20 2 This rule would apply to accruals for possible
damages, anticipated settlements, and perhaps estimated, but unpaid, future legal

third party, or assignee, constitutes payment to the person to whom or to which the taxpayer
owes the liability. Id.
Second, if the actual or constructive receipt rules would require a cash method taxpayer to
recognize income on the transfer, see supra note 189, a transaction with a so-called "third
party" can qualify as payment to the person to whom or to which the taxpayer owed (again, the
"other person"). For example, the purchase of an annuity contract would not constitute payment
to the "other person" unless the transaction transfers ownership of the annuity contract to the
"other person." Additionally, the regulations exempt qualified settlements of certain personal
injury liabilities under Code § 130 and qualified payments to a designed settlement fund under
Code § 468B. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-6 (1992).
In addition, the "payment" requirement contemplates that the taxpayer will remit cash,
furnish a cash equivalent, or net offsetting accounts. The term "payment" does not include
either: (i) delivering the taxpayer's promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness, or (ii)
transferring an amount as a loan, refundable deposit, or contingent payment. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.461-4(g)(1)(ii)(A) (as amended in 1999).
Treasury Regulation § 1.461-4(g)(2) also offers two important clarifications to the rule
that economic performance applies as the taxpayer pays the other person. First, the rule applies
whenever a taxpayer settles a dispute in which another person alleged a tort, breach of contract,
or violation of law. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1999). Second, a liability to
make payments for services, property, or other consideration provided under a contract does
not qualify as a liability arising from a breach of that contract unless the payments represent
incidental, consequential, or liquidated damages. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(2)(i) (as amended in
1999).
201 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(7) (as amended in 1999).
202 Even if a liability arose from a cause of action that did not allege a tort, breach of
contract, or violation of law, the obligation would almost certainly fall into the spillover
category for "other liabilities." See supra note 201 and accompanying text. The Treasury
Regulations allow a taxpayer to expense "other liabilities" only as the taxpayer pays the third
party. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(7) (as amended in 1999). See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-11-019
(Dec. 11, 1996) (transfer of obligation to pay award on progressive slot machine defaults to
liability under Treasury Regulation § 1.461-4(g)(7)). Thus, taxpayers generally cannot deduct,
for income tax purposes, accruals for almost all types of litigation until making actual payment.
But see Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2 (as amended in 1992) (providing an exception when a taxpayer
contests an asserted liability and transfers money or other property to allow for the satisfaction
of the asserted liability).
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fees, 203 related to actions alleging, among other things: personal injury,
defamation, product liability, or other torts; breach of warranty or breach of
contract, including lease, real estate and government contract disputes; and patent
and copyright infringement, securities fraud, or violations of antitrust,
employment discrimination, and environmental laws. 204 The economic
203 In some circumstances, an enterprise may accrue amounts for future legal fees that the

enterprise expects to incur in resolving a dispute. See, e.g., MESA AIR GROUP, INC., FORM 10-Q,
QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT To SECnON 13 OR 15(d) OF SECURrE EXCHANGE ACT OF

1934, at 10 (for the quarter ended June 30, 1996) (filed Aug. 14, 1996) (describing a $10
million special reserve established for the prospective resolution of certain disputed state and
federal regulatory tax matters and for the cost of defending certain shareholder lawsuits,
specifically including $5.7 million for costs of aggressive defense in pending shareholder
lawsuits"). As a basic principle, Code § 461 provides that if a liability arises out of the
performance of services to the taxpayer, economic performance occurs as such person provides
such services. I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(A)(i) (2000). This rule, however, obviously would not allow a
current deduction for future services. In addition, an estimated liability for future legal fees
would arguably not satisfy the statutory "all events" test. Until the attorney actually performs
the services, all events have not occurred which determine the fact of liability. I.R.C.
§ 461(h)(4) (2000).
204
In addition, based upon the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984), the IRS can presumably still obtain information about
accruals for federal income taxes by subpoenaing tax accrual workpapers. See supra notes
180-84 and accompanying text. In June 2002, the IRS announced a revised policy concerning
when it would request tax accrual workpapers. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B.
72. During examinations of returns filed prior to July 1, 2002, the revised policy provides that
the IRS will request tax accrual workpapers pertaining to a so-called "listed transaction," which
refers to various tax shelters, only if the taxpayer had an obligation to disclose the transaction.
Id In examinations of returns filed after July 1, 2002, the IRS will request tax accrual
workpapers related to a listed transaction if the taxpayer disclosed the transaction, but would
request all tax accrual workpapers if the enterprise did not disclose the listed transaction. IdTo
lend support to its policy change, the IRS stated that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the
tax practitioner privilege protect tax accrual workpapers from such a request. Id Prior to that
announcement, however, some commentators wondered about the extent, if any, to which the
new accountant-client, or tax practitioner, privilege in non-criminal tax matters may protect
those workpapers. See infra notes 261-64 and accompanying text. The new privilege applies
"to the extent the communication would be considered a privileged communication if it were
between a taxpayer and an attorney." I.R.C. § 7525 (a)(1) (2000). The Conference Committee
Report states that a taxpayer can waive the newly created privilege "in the same manner as the
attorney-client privilege," and gives disclosure to a third party as an example. H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 105-599, at 269 (1998). Because disclosure to an auditor waives the attorney-client
privilege under federal law, the IRS arguably can defeat any claim to the narrower privilege for
accountants and other tax preparers. In addition, the Code defines the "tax advice" eligible for
the privilege as "advice given by an individual with respect to a matter which is within the
scope of the individual's authority to practice (before the IRS]." I.R.C. § 7525(a)(3)(B) (2000).
In Announcement 2002-63, the IRS argued that because enterprises and auditors develop tax
accrual workpapers to either prepare or audit financial statements, any communications related
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performance requirement, however, would not bar the deduction of an expense
20 5
relating to the writeoff of an asset, such as a receivable.
Given the limitations on deductibility that the "economic performance"
requirement imposes for tax purposes, a litigator can potentially use an
opponent's tax returns to determine whether the opponent has accrued any
expense, again whether for potential damages, settlement, or attorney's fees,
related to or arising from the underlying litigation. 2° 6 In particular, Schedule
to those workpapers do not constitute "tax advice." I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27
I.R.B. 72. See generally Bruce Kayle, The Tax Adviser's Privilege in TransactionalMatters:A
Synopsis and a Suggestion, 54 TAX LAW. 509 (2001) (detailing the application of the attorneyclient and work product privileges in transactional tax matters and recommending a more
restricted application of privilege in tax matters).

205 For example, in late 1994 Procter & Gamble ("P&G") brought a lawsuit against
Bankers Trust New York Corp. ("BTNY") and certain subsidiaries (collectively, "Bankers
Trust"), alleging that Bankers Trust misled P&G about the risks of investing in certain
derivatives contracts. Bankers Trust claimed that P&G owed about $200 million on two such
contracts. P&G's lawsuit asked the court to declare one contract void and sought $130 million

in compensatory damages and unspecified punitive damages from Bankers Trust.
During the third quarter of 1995, BTNY disclosed that it wrote off $205 million related to
leveraged derivative contracts. In discussing this writeoff, BTNY's Form 10-Q for the quarter
ending September 30, 1995 stated:
Net charge-offs for the quarter were $218 million, compared with $28 million a year ago.
The current quarter's net charge-offs included leveraged derivative contract charge-offs of
$205 million against the allowance for credit losses. During the fourth quarter of 1994,
$423 million of leveraged derivative contracts that had been reclassified as receivables in
the loan portfolio were placed on a cash basis. Of this amount, $72 million was then
charged-off leaving a balance of $351 million. Since then some of these receivables have
been satisfactorily settled, but in line with the Corporation's credit policies, a $205 million
portion of the remaining balance has been charged-off.
BANKERS TRUST N.Y. CORP., FORM 10-Q, QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECnON 13 OR

15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 14 (for the quarterly period ended Sept.
30, 1995) (filed Nov. 14, 1995). In May 1996, P&G and Bankers Trust settled the litigation.
The Bureau of National Affairs reported that under the settlement P&G agreed both to pay
Bankers Trust $35 million and to assign benefits under a contract that Bankers Trust valued at
approximately $14 million. P&G announced that the company would charge the settlement
against a reserve that the company had previously established. In addition, reversing the
remaining reserve would increase before-tax earnings by approximately $120 million. Bankers
Trust announced that the settlement would not affect its earnings. Bankers Trust, P&G Settle
Two-Year-Old Lawsuit Surrounding Derivatives Losses, 28 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 635
(1996). Because Bankers Trust charged-off a receivable, the write-off would not appear on
Schedule M-1.
206
If the enterprise has accrued some amount, that amount effectively becomes a "floor"
for settlement negotiations. In addition, a litigator should attempt to look behind the actual
accrual to determine exactly what information management considered before concluding that
SFAS No. 5 required an accrual. Such efforts could uncover previously unknown data or
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M-1, Reconciliation of Income (Loss) per Books With Income (Loss) per Return,
on partnership returns of income, corporation income tax returns, and tax returns
for subchapter S corporations generally requires large corporations, limited
liability companies, partnerships, and subchapter S corporations to reconcile net
income or loss for financial accounting purposes to the income or loss reported
on the return. 207 For corporations filing a short-form income tax return, 20 8 part
IV, Reconciliation of Income (Loss) per Books With Income per Return, imposes
a similar requirement.2 0 9 As long as the underlying litigation remains unresolved,
the litigation opponent would not have paid amounts corresponding to any
financial accounting accruals, except perhaps some portion of the estimated
future legal fees. 2 10 As a result, if the litigation opponent must complete the
witnesses or reveal that management did not consider an especially damaging fact in its
evaluation. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
207
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1065, U.S. PARTNERSHP
RETURN OF INCOME 4 (2001); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM

1120, U.S. CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURN 4 (2001); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120S, U.S. INCOME TAX RETURN FOR AN S CORPORATION 4
(2001). Certain partnerships and corporations need not complete Schedule M-1, however. For
partnerships, including limited liability companies classified as partnerships for federal income
tax purposes, Form 1065 and related instructions exempt any partnership whose total receipts
for the tax year did not equal or exceed $250,000, whose total assets at the end of the year were
less than $600,000, and that filed Schedules K-i, Partner's Share of Income, Credits,
Deductions, etc., with the return and furnished those schedules to the partners on or before the
due date, including extensions, for the return. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, FORM 1065, U.S. PARTNERSHP RETURN OF INCOME 2, 4 (2001). Both the
corporation income tax return and the income tax return for subchapter S corporations provide
that any corporation, including a limited liability company classified as a corporation for federal
income tax purposes, owning less than $25,000 in total assets need not complete Schedule
M-1. INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120, U.S. CORPORATION
INCOME TAX RETURN 4 (2001); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM

1120S, U.S. INCOMETAX RETURN FOR AN S CORPORATION 4 (2001).
208 In addition to meeting several other requirements, a corporation can file the short
form, Form 1120-A, U.S. Corporation Short-Form Income Tax Return, only if the
corporation's gross receipts, total income, and total assets each fall below $500,000. INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS 1120 AND 1120-A, at 2

(2001).

209

INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120-A, U.S.

CORPORATION SHORT-FORM INCOME TAX RETURN 2 (2001). Any corporation, again including
a limited liability company classified as a corporation for federal income tax purposes, both

eligible to file the short-form and owning less than $25,000 in total assets need not complete
Part IV. Id.
210 For example, an enterprise might establish an accrual for estimated future legal fees in
the first quarter of a fiscal year. By the end of the fiscal year, the enterprise may have actually
incurred and paid some of those fees. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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reconciliation, either Schedule M-1 or Part IV, the tax return should reflect an
adjustment for any unpaid accruals related to the underlying litigation under
211
SFAS No. 5.
Although the various Schedule M-Is for partnership returns of income,
corporation income tax returns and tax returns for S corporations and Part IV for
corporations filing a short-form return contain slight variations, Line 1
universally requires enterprises completing these reconciliations to state "Net
Income (loss) per books."'2 12 If prepared properly, after adding and subtracting
211 See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text. Although the instructions to the

partnership return of income, corporation income tax return, corporation short-form income tax
return, and income tax return for a subchapter S corporation do not mention accrued, but
unpaid contingencies related to litigation, Publication 542 (for 1998 returns), Corporations,
presented an example that specifically lists "[r]eserve for contingencies" as an illustrative
adjustment. Compare INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., U.S. DEP'T OFTREASURY, PUBLICATION 542,
CORPORATIONS: FOR USE IN PREPARING 1998 RETURNS 12-13 (1998), with INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1065, at 23-24 (1998),
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMs 1120 AND
1120-A, at 16 (1998), and INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1120S, at 24 (1998); compare also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUBLICATION 542, CORPORATIONS: FOR USE IN PREPARING 2001
REIURNS 17 (2001), with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS
FOR FORM 1065, at 32 (2001), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS 1120 AND 1120-A, at 20 (2001), and INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1120S, at 26 (2001). The example used in
1998 describes the item as "the difference between the corporation's book and tax basis of its
reserve for contingencies." INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'TOFTREASURY, PUBLICATION
542, CORPORATIONS: FOR USE INPREPARING 1998 RErURNS 13 (1998). In 1999, however, the
IRS discontinued this particular example. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, PUBLICATION 542, CORPORATIONS: FOR USE IN PREPARING 1999 RETURNS (1999).
Interestingly and inexplicably, a sample return for Form 1120, included in Publication 542 for
2001 returns, specifically places reserves for contingencies in Schedule M-2, suggesting that a
litigator could determine from Schedule M-2, and any supplemental schedules, whether a
litigation opponent has accrued any estimated losses or expenses in anticipation of the
underlying litigation. INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUBLICATION 542,
CORPORATIONS: FOR USE INPREPARING 2001 RETURNS 17, 22 (2001) (Schedule M-2, line 6:
"Other decreases (itemize)"). The IRS seemingly erred when revising its publications.
212 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1065, U.S. PARTNERSHIP
RETURN OF INCOME 4 (2001); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM
1120, U.S. CORPORATION INCOME TAX REnRN 4 (2001); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120S, U.S. INCOME TAX RETURN FOR AN S CORPORATION 4
(2001); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120-A, U.S.
CORPORATION SHORT-FORM INCOME TAx RETJRN 2 (2001).
In almost all cases, the figure shown on Line I should equal the net income or loss that
appears on the enterprise's financial statements. An important exception, however, may apply
on a consolidated tax return. Consolidated financial statements generally include all
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the various line items corresponding to differences between financial and tax
accounting, the last line on Schedule M-1 or Part IV also equals the income or
loss reported on the tax return.2 13 The remaining lines itemize the differences
between financial accounting net income and tax accounting net income, listing
such things as income included on the return, but not recorded on the books this
year; expenses, such as travel and entertainment, recorded on the books this year,
but not included on the return; income, such as tax-exempt interest, recorded on
the books this year, but not included on the return; and deductions, such as
depreciation, included on the tax return, but not charged against book income this
year.
Depending upon the detail shown in a properly prepared Schedule M-l, or

Part IV, a litigator could theoretically determine directly from either the Schedule
M-1 or Part IV, and any supplemental schedules, whether a litigation opponent
has accrued any estimated losses or expenses related to the underlying litigation
without poring through a large number of documents or going through the time
and expense of using third-party discovery to obtain any audit workpapers and

majority-owned affiliates, including foreign subsidiaries. CONSOLIDATION OF ALL MAJORrrYOWNED SUBSIDIARIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 94 (Financial
Accounting Standards Bd. 1987). The Code, however, generally precludes a corporate taxpayer
from including a foreign corporation in an affiliated group. I.R.C. § 1504(b)(3) (2000). Thus,
the net income or loss per books reported on Line 1 of Schedule M-1 in a consolidated return
may not always equal the net income or loss shown on the consolidated financial statements.
When reviewing a consolidated tax return, a litigant must review the separate columnar
Schedule M-Is that the Treasury Regulations require for each company in the consolidated
group to determine if any consolidated group member's Schedule M-I contains an adjustment
for an accrual related to the underlying litigation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-750) (as amended
in 1994). To illustrate, Merrill Lynch's Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 25, 1998
lists fifty-three subsidiaries for the publicly traded parent corporation as of February 24, 1999.
MERRILL LYNCH & CO., Exhibit 21 to FORM 10-K, ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13
OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (for the fiscal year ended Dec. 25, 1998)
(filed Mar. 5, 1999) [hereinafter 1998 MERRILL LYNCH FORM 10-K]. A litigant may need to
review the separate Schedule M-Is for each of these subsidiaries to find the desired

information.
213

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OFTREASURY, FORM 1065, U.S. PARTNERSHIP
RETURN OF INCOME 4 (2001) (Schedule M-1, line 9: "Income (loss) (Analysis of Net Income
(Loss), line 1)"); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120, U.S.
CORPORATION INCOME TAX REIURN 4 (2001) (Schedule M-1, line 10: "Income (line 28, page
1)"); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120S, U.S. INCOME TAX
RETURN FOR AN S CORPORATION 4 (2001) (Schedule M-1, line 8: "Income (loss) (Schedule K,
line 23)"); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120-A, U.S.
CORPORATION SHORT-FORM INCOME TAX RETURN 2 (2001) (Part IV, line 8: "Income (line 24,
page 1)").
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any other related information. 2 14 To the extent, however, that the Schedule M-1,
or Part IV, and any supplemental schedules do not provide relevant details, the
litigator may have to request additional detail supporting any amounts shown on
the line for expenses recorded on the books but not deducted or included on the
tax returns for the applicable taxable years. 2 15 In addition, a litigant should
request and review any income tax audit reports for the tax years in question that
may identify audit adjustments arising from the economic performance
2 16
requirement.

214 If either the enterprise or its tax return preparer has omitted, whether inadvertently or
intentionally, an adjustment for an accrual related to the underlying litigation that should appear
on Schedule M-1 or Part IV, this discovery strategy will probably not uncover that accrual. In
addition, even upon audit the IRS may not identify the omission. For these reasons, a litigator
should not rely exclusively on tax returns and tax audit reports, if any, to uncover any accruals
related to the underlying litigation.
215 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1065, U.S. PARTNERSHIP
RETURN OF INCOME 4 (2001) (Schedule M-1, line 4: "Expenses recorded on books this year not

included on Schedule K, lines 1 through 11, 14a, 17g, and 18b (itemize)"); INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120, U.S. CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURN 4
(2001) (Schedule M-1, line 5: "Expenses recorded on books this year not deducted on this
return (itemize)"); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120S, U.S.
INCOME TAX RETURN FOR AN S CORPORATION 4 (2001) (Schedule M-1, line 3: "Expenses
recorded on books this year not included on Schedule K, lines 1 through 1 Ia, 15g, and 16b
(itemize)"); INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120-A, U.S.
CORPORATION SHORT-FORM INCOME TAX RETURN 2 (2001) (Part IV, line 5: "Expenses
recorded on books this year not deducted on this return (itemize)").
216 The applicable tax audit report depends upon the type of enterprise involved and
whether the enterprise agrees with the proposed changes. For partnerships and S corporations,
the IRS uses Form 4605, Examination Changes-Partnerships, Fiduciaries, S Corporations,
and Interest Charge Domestic International Sales Corporations, for agreed adjustments and
Form 4605-A, Examination Changes-Partnerships, Fiduciaries, S Corporations, and Interest
Charge Domestic International Sales Corporations, for unagreed adjustments. INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 4605, EXAMINATION CHANGESPARTNERSHIPS, FIDUCIARIES, S CORPORATIONS, AND INTEREST CHARGE DOMESTIC

INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATIONS (Rev. Nov. 1986); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 4605-A, EXAMINATION CHANGES-PARTNERSHIPS, FIDUCIARIES, S
CORPORATIONS, AND INTEREST CHARGE DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATIONS
(Rev. Sept. 1986). Similarly, the IRS uses Form 4549, Income Tax Examination Changes, for
agreed adjustments to tax returns that subchapter C corporations have filed and Form 4549-A,
Income Tax Examination Changes, for unagreed adjustments. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 4549, INCOME TAX EXAMINATION CHANGES (Rev. Nov. 1993);
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FORM 4549-A, INCOME TAX

EXAMINATION CHANGES (Rev. June 1994). At least in unagreed cases involving partnerships
and all corporations, the IRS also uses Form 886-A, Explanation of Items, to explain the items
adjusted. See generally I.R.M. 4237.420(1), .420(2)(u), .531, .541.
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In any event, narrowly tailored efforts to discover an enterprise's Schedule
M-1 or Part IV, plus any supplemental schedules and related income tax audit
reports, should more likely withstand the enterprise's objections to such a
discovery request, at least relative to requests to produce the enterprise's books,
records, and other financial documents or an auditor's workpapers. 2 17 In this
regard, a litigant seeking discovery of a tax return solely to review the Schedule
M-l or Part IV and any supplemental schedules or income tax audit reports could
quite easily offer to accept the production of a redacted tax return or income tax
audit report that hides income amounts and other sensitive information.
Additionally, both the ability to isolate this information in a particular place
on a tax return, especially when compared to the unattractive alternative of
reviewing voluminous accounting records and numerous audit workpapers, and
the level of detail typically present in a tax return, relative to financial statements,
offer two other critical advantages over alternative discovery strategies. Because
both enterprises preparing financial statements and auditors reviewing them use
materiality thresholds, financial statements typically group multiple account
balances together. In contrast, an income tax preparer, whether an enterprise's
employee or a paid income tax preparer, does not enjoy any such materiality
threshold. In most circumstances, two overriding reasons discourage tax return
preparers from reporting amounts in large, generalized groupings. First, both tax
return preparers and enterprises filing returns typically desire to reduce tax audit
risk. Many practitioners believe that providing detailed, low-dollar amount line
items gives the IRS less incentive to begin a full-blown audit.2 18 Second, using
more detailed line items than found in financial statements typically enables a tax
return preparer to save time on preparing the subsequent year's income tax
return. Most enterprises that must complete Schedule M-1 or Part IV to reconcile
net income or loss for financial accounting purposes to the income or loss
reported on the tax return list adjustments that recur from year to year. Most
manufacturers, for example, must report adjustments for depreciation and
inventories. 2 19 Rather than review numerous workpapers every year, a tax return
217 See infra notes 323-24 and accompanying text.
218 One empirical study at least indirectly supports this belief. Using data from IRS
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Programs, the study found that instances of
noncompliance increased with the size of a particular line-item. Steven Kilepper & Daniel
Nagin, The Anatomy of Tax Evasion, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 10 (1989). Although various
reasons could explain this result, common sense indicates that the IRS would pay closer
attention to larger line items, both when selecting returns for audit and when planning an audit.
219 Under the accelerated cost recovery system in Code § 168, enterprises can usually
claim larger depreciation deductions for tax purposes than they allocate to the current period
under the straight line method that most enterprises use to calculate depreciation for financial
accounting purposes. I.R.C. § 168 (2000 & Supp. 2002). In contrast, the uniform capitalization
rules in Code § 263A require taxpayers to include certain indirect costs in inventory that
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preparer can simply look at the prior year's Schedule M-1 or Part IV, and any
supplemental schedules, to quickly identify most, if not all, of the necessary
220
adjustments.
The litigation between Orange County and Merrill Lynch can help illustrate
this concept and discovery technique. Because Merrill Lynch did not pay the
$400 million settlement amount to Orange County until September 1999,221
Merrill Lynch presumably could not deduct amounts that the company had
previously accrued until its 1999 tax year. By requesting and carefully examining
the Schedule M-Is and any supplemental schedules in Merrill Lynch's tax
returns following the filing of its lawsuit, and any related income tax audit
reports from the IRS, counsel for Orange County might have uncovered an
accrual, either not otherwise discoverable or discoverable only after deposing
personnel from Merrill Lynch or its auditor, Deloitte & Touche LLP, or
reviewing voluminous accounting records or audit workpapers. To repeat,
discovery of such an accrual could have led to other information, such as an
important document or potential witness, relevant to the underlying litigation.
Consequently, discovery of Schedule M-1 or Part IV, the corresponding
supplemental schedules in an enterprise's tax returns, and any related tax audit
reports may enable a litigation opponent to uncover an accrual or other
information related to the underlying lawsuit. To date, however, no reported
decision has addressed the discoverability of these documents for this purpose,
generally accepted accounting principles would otherwise allow the taxpayer to expense
immediately. I.R.C. § 263A (2000). These rules create differences between tax and financial
accounting.
220 Specific general ledger detail accounts often identify Schedule M-1 line items, such as
meals and entertainment. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 274(n) (2000) (generally disallowing a tax
deduction for fifty percent of meals and entertainment otherwise allowable). The income tax
preparer will simply use the detail amounts from the company's general ledger from year to
year to complete the relevant line on Schedule M- 1.
221 Merrill Lynch's 1998 Form 10-K states:
Under the settlement terms, ML & Co. undertook to pay $400 million to Orange
County [and] approximately $17 million to Irvine Ranch Water District .... Payment by
ML & Co. will be due approximately five business days after May 3, 1999, the first
business day following the expiration of the time for any party to appeal from [the District
Court's] finding of good faith[, which bars any potential claims for contribution,
indemnity or similar relief by non-settling parties].
1998 MERRILL LYNCH FORM 10-K, supra note 212, at 15. Merrill Lynch's Form 10-Q for the
quarterly period ended September 24, 1999 states: "In September 1999, Merrill Lynch paid
remaining liabilities of $400 and $17 plus interest in settlement of the Orange County action
and the related Irvine Ranch Water District action, respectively." MERRILL LYNCH & Co.,
FORM 10-Q, QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECrION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SmE
s
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 12 (for the quarterly period ended Sept. 24, 1999) (filed Nov. 5,
1999).
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and no other commentator has suggested the possibility or the opportunities that
Schedule M-1, or Part IV, and related information provides for litigants,
especially plaintiffs, during the discovery process.

IV. DISCOVERY OPPORTUNITIES
Collectively, these three developments-the enhanced disclosure rules in
Management's Discussion and Analysis, the Supreme Court's decision in the
Arthur Young case, and the addition of the "economic performance" requirement
to Code § 461-have fundamentally changed the legal landscape compared to
what existed at the time that the legal and accounting professions adopted the
1975 accord. Subject to an important exception for securities litigation, 222 these
developments seemingly present both important discovery opportunities for
litigators, especially counsel for plaintiffs, and dangerous pitfalls for attorneys
representing businesses, especially firms that need audited financial statements.
As a result, litigators should recognize the discovery possibilities of obtaining
accounting information and supporting data regarding contingencies.
Sophisticated litigators will carefully examine the opponent's financial
statements and securities filings for information about any contingency related to
the dispute. In appropriate circumstances, counsel will seek information about
relevant contingent liabilities during discovery, by examining the opponent's
books, records, and tax returns or requesting such information from the
opponent's auditor.
Surprisingly few reported decisions, however, address attempts to discover
information about litigation reserves. The fact that parties generally cannot
appeal discovery orders until the court has entered a final judgment perhaps
explains the paucity of appellate opinions.22 3 By that time, the litigants may have
either concluded that the legal issues that arose in discovery do not merit
222 In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress generally imposed a
stay of discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment
in any private action under the federal securities laws. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(3)(B) (2000). See, e.g., SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. United States Dis. Court for the N. Dist.
of Cal., 189 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court's order granting limited
discovery for pendent state law claims violated the stay provision); cf Tobias Holdings, Inc. v.
Bank United Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 162, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting discovery for
independent state law claims when allowing discovery does not represent an "impermissible
'end run' around the automatic stay provision).
223 Unless the application for discovery constitutes the only pending proceeding, such as
when a court in one federal district quashes a subpoena or otherwise denies discovery from a

person not a party to an action pending in a different district, neither side can appeal a
discovery order, typically an interlocutory order, until the court enters a final judgment. 8
CHARLES A. WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE § 2006, at 76 (2d ed. 1994)
(discussing the general rule and some limited exceptions).
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pursuing on appeal or decided to base any appeal on other issues. The
surprisingly small number of reported decisions that address these issues,
however, suggests that litigators rarely request accounting information related to
contingencies or working papers. Some litigators may decide that the expected
benefits from such data do not outweigh the costs to obtain the information.
Many litigators, however, do not know that this information exists or
underestimate its strategic and practical value. Before requesting any information
regarding contingencies from a litigation opponent, smart litigators will consider
whether an opponent can request similar information from their client. In this
regard, attorneys representing individuals, especially tort plaintiffs, governmental
bodies and agencies, and businesses that do not require audited financial
statements generally need not worry about this downside. Discovery disputes,
however, can become expensive and time-consuming.
A. General Scope of Discovery
After recent amendments effective December 1, 2000, Rule 26(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally allows parties to "obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of
any party ... ." Stated simply, a party can discover relevant, non-privileged
information. Several important legal defenses, however, affect a litigant's ability
to obtain discovery during litigation. These legal issues include legal relevancy,
the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, and in some states, the
accountant-client privilege.
1. Relevancy
Rule 26(b)(1) generally allows a party to obtain any relevant information
from both other parties and nonparties during discovery. While discussing an
earlier version of that rule, the Supreme Court stated that the relevancy
requirement "has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on,
or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is
or may be in the case."2 24 In addition, Rule 26(b)(1) specifically states that
"[rielevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

224 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citing Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 499-501 (1957), and an earlier version of WRIGHT Er AL., supra note
223); see also Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIOCLC, 103 F.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Generally speaking, 'relevance' for discovery
purposes is broadly construed.").
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evidence." 225 Significantly, the last sentence in Rule 26(b)(1) explicitly directs
courts to construe the relevancy requirement more loosely during the discovery
phase than at trial, when the Federal Rules of Evidence apply. 226 As a result,
information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Rule 26(b)(1) presumably
applies the same standard to discovery requests directed to both parties and
227
nonparties.
Under this expansive interpretation, a federal district court or state trial court
following rules similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could easily
conclude that information related to litigation reserves, whether financial
statements, books and records, 228 tax retuns,

229

audit workpapers, 230 audit

225 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1). That subdivision provides in its entirety:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in
accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant
information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to
the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).
IM. As discussed, infra at notes 323-24 and accompanying text, the last sentence gives a judge
discretion to limit the number of interrogatories and depositions when the judge deems the
request "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative," where the party seeking discovery had ample
opportunity to obtain the information, or where the burden of the request outweighs its benefit,
respectively. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
226
See WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 223, § 2008, at 99-100. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence defines relevant evidence for purposes of admissibility at trial. FED. R. EvID. 401.
227 See, e.g., Fein v. Numex Corp., 92 F.R.D. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Rule 26(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limits discovery to relevant matters, and makes no distinction
in this regard between information in the hands of parties and that held by nonparties.").
228 Some courts, however, have refused to permit a party to discover information
pertaining to reserves that enterprises, especially insurance companies, may have set aside to
satisfy future claims. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 558 A.2d 1091,
1091 (1989) (denying request to produce information related to reserves on relevancy grounds
because the fact that insurance company had established reserves did not necessarily mean that
insurer believed applicable policies would cover hazardous waste claims).
22 9
Inprotecting the privacy of tax returns on other grounds, courts have often recognized,
at least implicitly, the relevance of tax returns. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's
note to 1970 amendment to subdivision (b).
230
See, e.g., In re Diasonics Sec. Utig., Case No. C-83-4584-RFP(FW), 1986 WL 53402
(N.D. Cal. 1986). In that case, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel Arthur Young & Co. to
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inquiry letters, 23 1 or information related to any investigation by the now-defunct

Public Oversight Board qualifies as "relevant" in almost any case. In addition,
produce documents prepared by or disclosed to Diasonics' auditor so that the accounting firm
could assess how pending litigation, including the underlying lawsuit, would affect Diasonics'
financial condition. The court granted the motion, finding that neither the attorney-client
privilege nor the work product doctrine excused production because the documents "were
generated for the business purpose of creating financial statements which would satisfy the
requirements of the federal securities laws and not to assist in litigation." ld at * 1. The court
reasoned, at least in part, that although disclosure to someone sharing a common interest under
a guarantee of confidentiality does not necessarily waive the work product protection, an
independent accountant's responsibilities to creditors and the investing public transcend any
such guarantee.

231 With one exception, the recent reported cases have ordered discovery of audit inquiry
letters. Compare United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985);
Indep. Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 117 F.R.D. 292 (D.D.C. 1987), and In re
Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 132 B.R. 478 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (all granting motions to
compel production of letters which attorneys sent to public accounting firms), with Tronitech,
Inc. v. NCR Corp., 108 F.R.D. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (denying motion to compel discovery of
audit inquiry letter).
Perhaps most significantly, in a sealed opinion arising from a grand jury investigation and
subpoena involving Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York reportedly held that disclosures about potential litigation in an
audit inquiry letter from outside counsel waived both the attorney-client privilege and the work
product protection as to the underlying information. Breckinridge L. Willcox, Martin Marietta
and the Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Protection, 49 MD. L
REV. 917, 935-39 (1990). The NationalLaw Journalpublished a story that stated that Senior
District Judge Edmund L. Palmieri ordered the company's attorneys to produce certain
materials that they used to write letters to auditors outlining the case's status and merits and
held two prominent lawyers in contempt when they failed to do so. Sherry R. Sontag, Sealed
Order Still Haunts Defense Bar, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 9, 1989, at 1; see also Subcomm. on Audit
Inquiry Responses, Section of Bus. Law, A.B.A., Inquiry of a Client's Lawyer Concerning
Litigation, Claims, and Assessments: Auditing InterpretationAU Section 337, 45 BUS. LAW.
2245, 2248 (1990).
More recently, Judge John Martin of the same court granted a motion to compel that
plaintiffs in a securities fraud case pending in federal court in Florida involving Sensormatic
Electronics Corp. filed against third party Willkie Far & Gallagher, a leading New York law
firm. The motion to compel sought certain documents relating to an investigation that the law
firm conducted on behalf of Sensormatic's audit committee. The audit committee had
disclosed the results of the investigation to Ernst & Young, the company's auditing firm, to
obtain an unqualified audit opinion. The court held that this disclosure waived the attorneyclient privilege. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Willkie Farr & Gallagher, No. M8-85
(JSM), 1997 WL 118369 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997).
One recent article suggests that the work product doctrine does protect audit-inquiry
responses. Sharp & Stanger, supra note 19. In their article, Sharp and Stanger criticize cases
compelling discovery of audit-inquiry responses for misinterpreting the work product doctrine.
Id at 202-09 (discussing United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
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because most punitive damages awards depend, at least in part, upon the
defendant's financial condition, most courts would likely hold that financial
statements qualify as relevant to the issue of punitive damages and, therefore,
allow discovery. 232 Similarly, in any lawsuit in which a party seeks to disgorge
business damages, a court would almost certainly allow discovery of the
233
opposing party's financial statements.
Because litigation contingencies represent accruals or disclosures related to a

specific claim in a lawsuit, the supporting materials related to litigation
contingencies almost by definition represent materials "relevant to the claim or
defense." Audit workpapers, for example, may reveal the enterprise's estimate of

a contingent liability, data which the business used to compute the estimate, or
other information which the auditor gathered to verify the appropriateness of the

1985); Indep. Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 117 F.R.D. 292 (D.D.C. 1987);
Sealed Drexel Case, discussed in Sontag, supra, at 3; In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 132
B.R. 478 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Under Seal), 33 F.3d 342
(4th Cir. 1994)). Citing three recent cases that support their proposition, two of which related to
documents other than audit-inquiry responses, Sharp and Stanger conclude that courts should
interpret the work product doctrine as offering protection to audit-inquiry responses, which are
prepared because of litigation, and therefore not in the regular course of business. Id. at 204,
209-11 (discussing Tronitech, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 108 F.R.D. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Vanguard
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Banks, No. 93-CV-4627, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13712 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(ordering discovery of audit-inquiry-like responses); United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194
(2d Cir. 1998) (ordering discovery of documents that assessed the desirability of a business
transaction based on the anticipated result of expected litigation)). Sharp and Stanger, however,
admit that they bias their argument in favor of work product protection, and come to their
conclusion based on the interpretation of a small number of courts, discussing three cases that
protected audit-inquiry, or audit-inquiry-like, responses from discovery, and five that compelled
discovery. Id. at 201-11. The one case involving an audit inquiry response that does support
their argument, Tronitech, Inc., 108 F.R.D. at 655 (described supra in this note), does not cite
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984). See supra notes 180-84 and
accompanying text.
232
See, e.g., Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding
that defendants asserting a counterclaim for punitive damages could obtain discovery regarding
the plaintiffs net worth); Caruso v. Coleman Co., 157 F.R.D. 344 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding
that financial statements were relevant and discoverable as to the issue of punitive damages).
233
See, e.g., Upchurch v. USTNET, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 157 (D. Or. 1994) (holding that
because defendant's counterclaim alleged destruction of business, plaintiff could obtain
information regarding defendant's financial status); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 76
F.R.D. 420 (N.D. M. 1977) (holding that manufacturers were entitled to copies of financial
statements as the information might be relevant to damages). See note 170, supra, and
accompanying text for a discussion of the relevancy for discovery purposes of the underlying
workpapers related to litigation contingencies.
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enterprise's treatment. 234 Such information bears on, or reasonably could bear
on, an issue potentially involved in the litigation, such as liability or damages,
and could easily lead to potential witnesses, helpful documents, or other

234 When a litigant requests the production of documents or other discovery from an
adversary's auditor, whether the request seeks working papers generally, information about
specific contingencies, or responses to audit letters to attorneys, numerous tensions arise. First,
the auditor must decide how to respond. As a practical matter, in most cases the auditor wants
to keep the client happy so that the client remains a client. Because working papers usually
provide the easiest roadmap to the client's business organization and financial statements, the
client almost always prefers that the auditor not produce the working papers. In addition, the
client normally does not want the auditor to release any information relating to specific
contingencies or responses to audit inquiry letters. At least in the case of a SEC registrant,
however, the client cannot simply dismiss an auditor that decided to produce working papers,
information about specific contingencies, management's letter, a response to an audit letter to
an attorney, or other data, or otherwise comply with a discovery request, without any potentially
negative repercussions. Item 304(a) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.304(a) (2002), or for a
small business issuer, Item 304(a) of Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R. § 228.304(a) (2002), require a
registrant to report on Form 8-K within five business days and disclose in periodic filings and
certain other documents for two years certain information if the registrant dismisses an auditor
or the auditor resigns or declines to stand for reelection. The regulations require the former
auditor to submit a letter to the SEC, which the registrant must file within ten business days
after filing Form 8-K, but within two days after the registrant receives the letter from the former
auditor, either concurring or disagreeing with the statements contained in the Form 8-K. As no
surprise, the financial community views changes in auditors after almost any dispute with
considerable suspicion.
At the same time, the auditor must fulfill conflicting legal and professional
responsibilities. These obligations require the auditor to comply with legitimate discovery
requests, preserve client confidences, protect possible proprietary information about the
auditor's procedures, and maintain independence. In such situations, auditors sometimes
simply ignore the production request. Such an approach forces the requesting party to file a
motion to compel, but can result in sanctions against the auditor under Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rothschild & McKenna, supra note 19, at 405-07. As a more
preferable alternative, the auditor can move for a protective order and attempt to quash the
subpoena. In either event, the requesting party must decide whether to incur the costs necessary
to serve and then to enforce a third party subpoena in an action usually separate from the
underlying litigation.
If the requesting party decides to try to enforce a third party subpoena, unless and until the
court allows the client to intervene, the client does not become a party in that dispute and must
view the proceedings as a spectator. To illustrate, if requesting party B tries to enforce a
subpoena against accountant A to obtain documents relating to client C, legally speaking the
enforcement action does not involve C. This situation also creates some practical concerns for
C's counsel. Even if C intervenes in the dispute between B and A, C's counsel does not
represent A. As a result, any communications between C's counsel and A or A's counsel do
not qualify for the attorney-client privilege.
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admissible evidence. 2 35 Estimates of damages, probability measurements,
underlying facts, and attorney opinions and communications all exemplify the
types of information accounting personnel use to determine the financial
statement treatment of a litigation contingency; if nothing else, all these sources
of information represent materials related to a specific claim and should therefore
represent materials "relevant" under Rule 26(b)(1).
Either a party or nonparty may challenge a request for any accounting
information created after the underlying incident or commencement of the action
on the grounds that the request seeks information about matters arising after the
incident or the action's commencement. Although cases exist in which courts
have limited discovery to matters arising prior to the commencement of the
action, events occurring after that time can qualify as relevant. For this reason,
most commentators correctly reject any rule that limits discovery to matters
occurring before the action's commencement. In addition, or alternatively, a
nonparty, such as an auditor, may attempt to quash the discovery request on
relevancy grounds. 236 Several courts, however, have appropriately concluded
237
that nonparties may not assert lack of relevancy.
2. Absence of Privilege
Rule 26(b)(1) prevents a party from discovering privileged material. 2 38 As
recently as Jaffee v. Redmond,239 the Supreme Court has stated that it disfavors
claims of privilege. Against that backdrop, two potential privileges exist: the
attorney-client privilege and the accountant-client privilege. Except in noncriminal tax cases, federal common law does not recognize an accountant-client
privilege.

235 See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 820 n.16 (1984) (dicta);
Indep. Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 117 F.R.D. 292 (D.D.C. 1987)
(accepting Insurance Company of North America's contention that audit letters could lead to
admissible evidence bearing on various defenses that the insurance company had raised).
236
See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, AFLCIO-CLC, 103 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (vacating an order compelling a third-party public
relations firm to produce fourth-party union documents because the district court erred in
holding the documents were relevant for discovery purposes).
237 See, e.g., Benetz v. Photon, Inc., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 791 (D. Mass. 1975)
(refusing to consider an irrelevancy objection from Arthur Young and Company to a deposition
ancillary to an action pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania); Cooney v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 717 (E.D. Pa. 1968); see also Berrie v. Berrie,
457 A.2d 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983) (applying state rule).
238 FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing discovery of materials "not privileged").
239 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
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a.Attorney-Client Privilege
In most discovery disputes over accounting information regarding
contingencies generally, and audit inquiry letters in particular, the attorney-client
privilege does not apply. In the first place, no confidential communication
between an attorney and the client exists. If internal accounting employees
receive such communications for purposes of preparing financial statements, the
communication often does not satisfy the "legal advice" requirement, and the
privilege likely will not attach. For example, in Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co.,240
the court stated that "attorney-to-client communications reflected in the risk
24 1
management documents" were not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The court found that the aggregate risk documents did not contain privileged
communications "to a degree that makes the aggregate information
privileged. '242 Although the court's decision related only to the aggregate risk
management documents, it did at least mention the possibility that even those
communications related to the individual case reserves might have lost any
243
attorney-client privilege.
Second, disclosing such a communication to a third party, such as the
client's auditor, normally waives the privilege. 244 Even if the attorney-client
privilege did apply to certain communications, the client-or possibly even the
attorney--can waive the privilege. Waiver occurs typically where a party
discloses voluntarily otherwise privileged attorney-client communications, such
as in a proxy statement or other securities filing. 245 In the context of discovery of
240 816 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
241 Id. at 403.
242 id

243 Id at 403 n.5 (stating no view whether the privilege attached to the individual case
reserves, but adding that such a determination would require analysis of whether management
used "confidential information" to calculate the reserves).
244
See, e.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973) (subsequent disclosure to
accountant waived attorney-client privilege); see also United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129
F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that MIT forfeited both the attorney-client privilege and work
product protection by disclosing documents sought by the IRS to the Defense Contract Audit
Agency, the auditing arm of the Department of Defense, during a performance review on
certain defense contracts and joining five other circuits, out of the six other circuits that have
considered the question, in concluding that earlier disclosure at the request of government
agency destroys the privilege).
245 See United States v. Workman, 138 F.3d 1261, 1263 (8th Cir. 1998); 8 WRIGHT Er
AL., supra note 223, § 2016.2.
One recent decision, In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
suggests that proxy statement disclosures waive the attorney-client privilege. In that case,
Pioneer asked outside counsel to provide an opinion concerning the tax consequences of a
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an enterprise's documentation concerning SFAS No. 5 determinations, disclosure
of the information outside of the confidential relationship represents the most
likely source of waiver of the privilege because disclosure to the auditors, or to a
financial analyst or investment banker, defeats the existence of confidentiality
246
between the attorney and the client.
Disclosure to internal accounting personnel might constitute waiver,
especially when the disclosure arose from financial statement preparation, as
opposed to where the disclosure occurred in the context of obtaining legal
advice. In addition, the fact that accounting personnel receive such
documentation to support disclosures to third party financial statement readers
(either the public or creditors) might constitute a waiver of the privilege.
Assuming accounting personnel ultimately use otherwise confidential
information from the enterprise's attorney that indicates a "probable" (in the
SFAS No. 5 sense) loss in a lawsuit, the enterprise has at least indirectly
disseminated the information related to litigation contingencies by way of the

financial statements. In other words, if the financial statements include an
accrued liability for a lawsuit, the enterprise has, in effect, disclosed that its
management-and possibly its attorney-determined that a "probable" loss
exists. 247 Even when the financial statement footnotes merely disclose pending
litigation, the mention means management has determined that a better than
remote chance exists that the enterprise may incur a loss. 248 One could therefore
argue that the enterprise has--by way of its financial statements-disclosed

proposed merger, which Pioneer intended to include in its proxy statement. Id at 1373. The
court held that Pioneer's reliance on and disclosure of outside counsel's opinion in its proxy
statement waived the attorney-client privilege, but only with respect to the documents that
formed the basis for the advice, the documents that outside counsel considered when it
rendered that advice, and all reasonably contemporaneous documents that reflected discussions
concerning that advice. Id at 1374-75. The Pioneer court did not rule on the issue of work
product protection, finding the record insufficient to make such a ruling. The court did,
however, rule that Pioneer's disclosure of confidential information to expert witnesses waived
both the attorney-client privilege and work product protection to the same extent as any other
disclosure. Id at 1375-76.
246 See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530,540 (5th Cir. 1982) (concluding
no privilege because "[c]onfidentiality ...is neither expected nor preserved, for they are
created with the knowledge that independent accountants may need access ... to complete the
audit"); United States v. Rosenthal, 142 F.R.D. 389, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating no privilege
where materials communicated to attorney with understanding that it will be communicated to
accountants eliminates requisite confidentiality); Indep. Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 117 F.R.D. 292, 297 (D.D.C. 1987) (documents written for accountants not
privileged due to disclosure).
247
See supra notes 36-43, 49 and accompanying text.
24 8
See supra text accompanying notes 54 and 73.
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otherwise confidential conclusions regarding the lawsuit and therefore waived
any attorney-client privilege.
Although no cases deal directly with this argument, two cases that
considered closely related matters provide some insight. In Carey-Canada,Inc. v.
California Union Insurance Co.,249 the court considered whether the attorneyclient privilege applied to in-house counsel's documents related to his efforts to
prepare the corporation's litigation footnotes in its annual report.25 0 The
documents consisted of drafts of the final footnote disclosures that the in-house
counsel forwarded to the corporation's management for final approval. 25 1 Noting
that the drafts related to a public document, the court nevertheless held the
attorney-client privilege applied to the documents. 25 2 Stating that the documents
"were submitted to [management] for approval and thus only were
recommendations," the court found that the company's management preserved
the confidentiality due to the retention of an "option to reject disclosure of any
253
advice or information."
254
On somewhat different facts, the court in In re GrandJury Proceedings
held that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to communications that an
attorney planned to use for drafting a prospectus. 255 The clients intended the
prospectus to relate to a proposed private placement of limited partnership
interests in coal-mining equipment leases, but within two weeks of retaining the
attorney, the clients discontinued his services. 256 The court compelled disclosure
of the communications in which the attorney took part although he never began
work on the prospectus itself.257 The court found that the "[t]he significant fact is
that the information given the [attorney] was to assist in preparing such
prospectus which was to be published to others and was not intended to be kept
' 258
in confidence."
Although neither the Carey-Canada court nor the Grand Jury court
considered the implication of indirect disclosure, they both indicate that courts
will typically focus on the relationship between the purportedly privileged
249 118 F.R.D. 242 (D.D.C. 1986).
250

See id. at 246.

251 Id.
252

Id. at 247-48.
253 Id. The court also noted that "[t]he fact that communications" originated from the
attorney did not affect the privilege because the communications were based upon confidential
information provided by the client. Id at 248.
254 727 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1984).
255 Id. at 1358.
256 Id. at 1353-54.

257 Id. at 1358.
258 Id
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information and the final form of disclosure. One can view the Carey-Canada
decision as resting on the fact that the drafts reflected the attorney's "legal
opinion as to what information should be disclosed." 259 The court might have
reached a different conclusion had the attorney's opinions not affected the final
form of disclosure except to the extent accounting personnel considered the
attorney's opinions in their SFAS No. 5 analysis. A GrandJury court might also
find that such indirect disclosures waive the privilege as to the underlying
information because the public nature of the disclosures reveals no intention to
260
keep the information confidential.
b. Accountant-ClientPrivilege
Apart from a narrow accountant-client privilege found in the Internal
Revenue Code, no accountant-client privilege exists under either federal law or
the common law. 26 1 As a result, federal courts do not recognize an accountantclient privilege in any non-tax case involving, in whole or in part, a federal
claim. 26 2 With different degrees of success, however, businesses in state court
proceedings have attempted to assert the accountant-client privilege to prevent
litigation opponents from discovering workpapers and other documents which
their employees or independent auditor created. At least thirty states have

259
260

Carey-Canada, Inc. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 118 F.R.D. 247,247 (D.D.C. 1986).
See, e.g., In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 118 B.R. 866, 870 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.

1990) (finding that underlying information related to attorney opinion letter was not

privileged).
261 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNErH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 5427 (1980 & Supp. 1995). In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S.
805 (1984), the Supreme Court observed that "'no confidential accountant-client privilege
exists under federal law."' Id. at 817 (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335
(1973)).
262 See, e.g., Win. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cit.
1982) (holding that federal law favoring admissibility, rather than any state law privilege,
controlled in a case involving antitrust and state law claims). In federal courts, issues relating to
the accountant-client privilege arise only in civil tax cases and diversity cases. In the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Bill of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 3411(a), 112 Stat. 685, 750
(codified at I.R.C. § 7525 (2000)), Congress recently created an accountant-client privilege in
civil tax matters either before the IRS or in federal courts. That legislation, however, does not

protect accountant-client communications from disclosure in other contexts and does not
change the "ability of any other regulatory body, including the [SEC], to gain or compel

information." S. REP. No. 105-174, at 71 (1998), reprinted in 1998 TAx

LEGSLATION: LAW,
EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS: IRS RESTRUCTURING AND REFRM ACT OF 1998 (CCH) 618.

The accountant-client privilege can also apply when state privilege law provides the rule of
decision under the Eriedoctrine.
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enacted a statutory accountant-client privilege.26 3 Again, even in those states that
recognize an accountant-client privilege, the privilege requires a confidential
communication. In addition, disclosing information regarding the subject matter
of the communication to third parties, such as financial analysts or investment
264
bankers, presumably waives the privilege.
B. Other Defenses to Discovery Requests or Limitations on the
Scope of Discovery
In addition to lack of relevancy and privilege, the work product doctrine may
protect information related to litigation reserves and contingencies from
discovery. The work product protection, however, only applies to materials
"prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial" and does not apply to materials
prepared in the ordinary course of business. Finally, either a party or a third party
can seek a protective order from unreasonably cumulative, burdensome, or
expensive discovery requests.
1. Work Product
Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes the socalled work product doctrine, which generally excepts trial preparation materials
from discovery. 265 The work product doctrine, however, only applies to materials
263 A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado notes that "[alt least thirty states

have codified some form of protection for communications between an accountant and a

client." Colo. State Bd. of Accountancy v. Zaveral Boosalis Raisch, 960 P.2d 102, 106 n.3
(Colo. 1998) (listing applicable statutes). A recent law review note suggests that the recognition
of a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), opens
the door to new arguments that the federal judiciary should recognize an accountant-client
privilege in federal matters. The article, however, ultimately concludes that even under the new
and broader approach to granting privileges espoused in the recent decision, the federal system
will not recognize an accountant-client privilege until more states recognize meaningful
accountant-client privileges. Thomas . Molony, Note, Is the Supreme Court Ready to
Recognize Another Privilege? An Examination of the Accountant-Client Privilege in the
Aftermath ofJaffee v. Redmond, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 247 (1998).
264 See supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
265 Rule 26(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in
accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:

(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4)
of this rule, [which addresses trial preparation of experts,] a party may obtain
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
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"prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial" and does not apply to materials
prepared in the ordinary course of business or otherwise for some purpose not
primarily concerned with litigation. Because enterprises often undergo annual
audits, the response to an audit inquiry letter probably falls in "the ordinary
266
course of business" category.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) codifies the Supreme Court's
formulation of immunity to an attorney's "written statements, private memoranda
and personal recollections prepared or formed ... in the course of his legal
duties." 267 The Rule protects "documents and tangible things ... prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other
party's representative." 268 The Rule protects such materials by providing a
requirement that an opposing party that seeks the information must: (1) show a
"substantial need" for the materials; and (2) prove that the party cannot obtain the
"substantial equivalent" by other means without "undue hardship." 269 Even
when the party seeking discovery has made such a showing, the Rule requires the
court to "protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
270
concerning the litigation."

subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by
or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the other
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
266 See, e.g., United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985);
Indep. Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 117 F.R.D. 292 (D.D.C. 1987); In re
Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 132 B.R. 478 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (all rejecting arguments
that letters which attorneys sent to public accounting firms qualified for work product
protection); see also Melissa D. Shalit, Note, Audit Inquiry Letters and Discovery: Protection
Based on Conpulsion, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1263 (1994) (arguing that the work product
doctrine probably does not protect audit inquiry letters from discovery unless the enterprise can
successfully assert that compulsion forced any disclosure).
267 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
268 FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(3).
269 1aj
270 Id
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Courts use the work product doctrine to "preserve[] the privacy of
preparation that is essential to the attorney's adversary role." 27 1 Because
materials an attorney creates will often represent opinions and legal theories, the
doctrine gives "virtually absolute protection" 272 to such materials to prevent an
opposing party from accessing these mental processes. 273 Yet, all of these
protections remain subject to one major qualification: a party must have prepared
274
the documents "in anticipation of litigation or for trial.",

a. Courts' Interpretationsof "In Anticipation of Litigation"
Although the definition of "in anticipation of litigation" varies from court to
court, 275 the Advisory Committee's note to the amendment to Rule 26(b)(3) in
1970 stated that "[m]aterials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or
pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation
purposes are not under the qualified immunity. ' 276 Although sometimes called
the "ordinary course of business exception," 277 the concept does not so much
create an exception to otherwise protected materials as it merely deems the
materials not worthy of the protection from the outset. Said another way, the fact
that the party (or its attorney or other representative) developed materials as part
of routine business practices indicates that the person in question indeed did not
prepare the materials in anticipation of litigation. 278 The concept has particular
271 Special Project, The Work ProductDoctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 784 (1983).
272 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 223, § 2023, at 329.
273 Courts and commentators often refer to attorney's opinions, conclusions, legal
theories, and mental impressions as "opinion work product," see Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et
Retordie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 731 (4th Cir. 1974); Special Project, supra note 271, at
817, while referring to fact work product as "ordinary work product." See In re Murphy, 560
F.2d 326, 329 n.1 (8th Cir. 1977).
274
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 223, § 2026, at 405
("As with all assertions of work-product protection, opinion work product is guarded against
discovery only if prepared in anticipation of trial; mental impressions of an attorney in service
to other objectives... are not protected by the doctrine.") (footnotes omitted).
275 See Robert H. Oberbillig, Note, Work Product Discovery:A MultifactorApproach to
the Anticipation of Litigation Requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), 66
IOWA L. REv. 1277, 1278 (1981) (stating that the courts' "methods for redefining the word
anticipation do little more than say that litigation is anticipated when litigation is anticipated").
276 Advisory Committee's Note, 48 F.R.D. 459, 501 (1970).
277 See, e.g., Thomas Wilson, Note, The Work ProductDoctrine: Why Have an Ordinary
Course ofBusiness Exception, 1988 COLUM. BuS. L. REV. 587, 595.
278 See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon & Steven S. Sparling, United States v. Adlman"
Protectionfor Corporate Work Product?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 627, 649 (1998) (noting that
documents prepared in the ordinary course of business "are not exceptions to the work-product
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importance in relation to discovery of materials that an enterprise develops for
purposes of SFAS No. 5 determinations, as the materials possess aspects of
business purposes while at the same time contain characteristics of materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation. Courts describe the determination of
whether an enterprise (or its attorney or other representative) prepares materials
in anticipation of litigation as "clearly a factual determination," 279 and no
definite conclusions will arise in the absence of a specific factual background.
Three cases, however, provide helpful-though rather disparate-insights into
the conclusions a court might reach in determining whether a party prepared
SFAS No. 5 materials "in anticipation of litigation."
i. PrimaryMotivating Purpose Standard
In United States v. Gulf Oil Corp.,280 the court addressed the issue of
whether the Department of Energy ("DOE") could obtain documents that Gulf
obtained pursuant to a merger agreement with Cities Service Oil and Gas Corp.
("Cities"). Some of the documents related primarily to an ongoing declaratory
judgment case that Cities had brought against the DOE and included letters and
memoranda that contained the mental impressions and legal theories of Cities'
in-house counsel. The court described other documents as "prepared for, and at
the request of," Cities' auditor, Arthur Young & Co. 28 l Although the proposed
merger eventually failed, Gulf retained microfilm versions of the documents
before returning the originals to Cities. 282 After the resolution of the declaratory
judgment case and when the DOE began an investigation into some of Cities'
crude oil pricing transactions, DOE attempted to subpoena the documents that
Gulf had on microfilm. 283 When Gulf refused to submit some of the requested
documents, the DOE brought an enforcement action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas. 284 The District Court allowed discovery
rule but simply fail to meet" the standard for work product protection); Wilson, supra note 277,
at 595 (stating that the "exception is based on a determination that documents created for
business purposes are probably not prepared in contemplation of a specific lawsuit").
279 Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397,401 (8th Cir. 1987).
280 760 F.2d 292 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
281 Id at 294.
282 Id. at 293.
283

Id. at 294.

284

Id. The DOE also brought a subpoena enforcement action against Arthur Young in the
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. See United States v. Arthur Young &
Co., I Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 448 (N.D. Okla. 1984). That court held that most of the
documents-including some considered in the Southern District of Texas case-enjoyed work
product protection. See id. at 453. After the DOE appealed the decision, the parties to the
appeal stipulated to a voluntary dismissal. See Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 294 n.4.
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of the items for which the parties claimed an attorney-client privilege, but denied
to the DOE discovery of any materials that Gulf claimed enjoyed work product
285
protection.
On appeal, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision as to those documents that Cities prepared on its own, but
reversed and remanded in relation to those documents that Cities prepared for
Arthur Young. 286 Relying on language from a Fifth Circuit case, the court stated
that its "inquiry should be to determine 'the primary motivating purpose behind
the creation of the document,"' and to obtain work product protection the
primary motivating purpose must have been "to assist in pending or impending
litigation." 287 Using this inquiry, the court found that Cities had not prepared the
documents "to assist Cities in the litigation," but had prepared them "to allow
Arthur Young to prepare financial reports" required under the federal securities
288
laws.
The Gulf court found support for its decision in a then-recent decision from
the Fifth Circuit that involved an IRS summons for the taxpayer's internally
generated "tax-pool analysis" workpapers. 289 El Paso used the tax-pool analysis
to measure potential tax liabilities that would affect the company's financial
statements. 290 Finding that El Paso did not prepare the analysis for "a specific
case for trial or negotiation," the El Paso court determined that the related
workpapers functioned solely to "back up a figure on a financial balance
sheet." 29 1 As such, the court found that El Paso did not prepare the workpapers
for the "primary motivating force" of preparing for litigation, but "with an eye on
292
its business needs, not on its legal ones."
The Gulf court found this reasoning "similarly explicative of why Cities
created the documents it delivered to Arthur Young," 293 and as in El Paso,
determined Cities prepared the documents for Arthur Young "primarily for the
business purpose of compiling financial statements which would satisfy ... the
federal securities laws." 294 Therefore, as in El Paso, the Gulf court held that
work product protection did not apply to these documents.
285 Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 295.
286 Id. at 298.
287 Id at 296 (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981)).
288 Id at 297.
289
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982).
290 Id. at 534.
291 Id. at 544.

292 Id. at 543.
293 GulfOil, 760 F.2d at 297.
294 Id.
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ii. United States v. AdIman: The "Becauseof" Test
The Second Circuit recently accepted a more expansive view of work
product protection in United States v. Adlman.295 In that case, the vice-president
of taxes for Sequa Corp. requested that its accountant at Arthur Andersen & Co.
prepare a memorandum to "evaluate the tax implications of [a] proposed
restructuring. '296 Knowing that the transaction would generate a large tax
refund, Sequa wished to obtain an analysis of the likely IRS challenges and a
summary of the relevant authorities. 297 The resulting fifty-eight page
memorandum included possible legal theories and strategies, as well as
"recommended preferred methods of structuring the transaction." 298 When the
IRS began an investigation, it demanded production of the memorandum. When
Sequa refused to produce the document, the IRS brought an enforcement action
299
in the district court for the Southern District of New York.
After the district court rejected Sequa's claim for work product protection,
Sequa appealed the decision to the Second Circuit. On appeal, the Adiman court
explicitly rejected the "primary motivating purpose" test that the courts used in
the Gulf and El Paso cases and instead applied a "because of' standard that has
been used in the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and District of Columbia
Circuits. 300 Under this "because of' formulation, the work product doctrine

protects documents that "'can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained
because of the prospect of litigation."' 30 1 Under this standard, a document does
not lose protection under the work product doctrine merely because the
document was created to assist with a business decision. In the court's view, "the
test should be whether, in light of the nature of the document and the factual
situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been
prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation." 30 2 The Adiman court
preferred this interpretation, as it found that the primary motivating purpose test
worked against the policies underlying the work product doctrine. 30 3 The
AdIman court also stated that the El Paso and Gulf courts requirement that the
materials had to be prepared to aid in litigation went against the language of the
295 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998).
296 Id.at 1195.
297 Id
298 Id

299 Id at 1196.
00 Id at 1198, 1202.
301 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 223, § 2024, at 343.
302 Id
303

Adlman, 134 F. 3d at 1200.

1098

OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1017

Rule. 304 The court, therefore, determined that merely because a party prepares a
document to assist in a business decision, work product protection remains where
30 5
the document "is created because of the prospect of litigation."
The Adiman court also provided some insight into the ordinary course of
business issue. In this regard, the court recognized that its interpretation of "in
anticipation of litigation" does not protect documents "prepared in the ordinary
course of business or that would have been created in essentially similar form
irrespective of the litigation." 3°6 Noting the statement in the Advisory
Committee's note to Rule 26(b)(3), 30 7 the court stated that "[e]ven if such
documents ... help in preparation for litigation, they do not qualify for protection
because it could not be fairly said that they were created 'because of ...
litigation." 30 8 In remanding the case to the district court, the Adiman court
provided the following formulation to guide the district court in determining
whether the memorandum was prepared in the ordinary course of business: "[i]f
the district court concludes that substantially the same Memorandum would have
been prepared in any event ... then the court should conclude the memorandum
was not prepared because of the expected litigation," and therefore should
withhold work product protection. 30 9 Even in such circumstances, however, the
district court retains "the authority to protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, strategies, and analyses of the party or its representative concerning
310
the litigation."
iii. Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co.: The Middle of the Gulf/Adlman Spectrum
Although the AdIman court presented the "primary motivating purpose" and
the "because of" tests as being mutually exclusive, courts that had already
adopted the "because of' formulation still sometimes introduced concepts of
primary motivating purpose analysis to reach a conclusion regarding the "in
anticipation of litigation" requirement. 3 11 The inconsistency is not surprising
304 Id at 1198 ("If the drafters... intended to limit its protection to documents made to
assist in preparation for litigation, this would have been adequately conveyed by the phrase
'prepared ... for trial"') (second ellipses in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)).
305 Id. at 1202.
306 Id

307 Advisory Committee's Note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1970) ("Materials assembled in the
ordinary course of business ... are not under the qualified immunity provided by this

subdivision.").
308
Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202.
309 Id at 1204.
310 Id. at 1202-03.
311 See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.
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because stating that a party created a document "because of' litigation is not easy
when the document has dual purposes. In Simon, the Eighth Circuit dealt with
just such a situation where it had to determine the discoverability of documents
generated by the risk management department of G.D. Searle & Co.
312
("Searle").
The risk management department utilized individual case reserve figures,
which the corporation's legal department supplied, to monitor the corporation's
products liability litigation and its litigation reserves.3 13 The risk management
department used the individual case reserves to generate aggregate case reserve
summaries for use in financial planning. 314 In determining whether the opposing
party could discover the documentation related to the reserves, the court relied on
the "because of' formulation to arrive at two conclusions: (1) the work product
doctrine protected the individual case reserve figures and related documentation;
and (2) the aggregate case reserve figures and documentation constituted work
product only "to the extent that they disclose the individual case reserves
315
calculated by Searle's attorneys."
The Simon court noted that "the individual case reserves reveal the mental
impressions, thoughts, and conclusions of an attorney," and that "by their very
nature they are prepared in anticipation of litigation." 3 16 Recognizing that the
work product doctrine was designed to prevent "unwarranted inquiries into the
files and mental impressions of an attomey," 317 the court determined that the
work product doctrine protected any documents that contained information
related to individual case reserves. 3 18 The court found, however, that the
aggregate case reserves did not reveal the individual case reserve figures "to a
3 19
degree that brings [them] within the protection of the work product doctrine.
1992) (using explicitly the "because of' formulation, but then stating that the court must
"[dletermin[e] the driving force behind the preparation" of each document); Simon v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397,401 (8th Cir. 1987) (using the "because of' test, but noting that the
requested documents were "in the nature of business planning documents"); Binks Mfg. Co. v.
Nat'l Presto Indus., 709 F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (7th Cir. 1983) (using the "because of' test but
inquiring into the "motivating factor" behind the creation of the document). See generally
Yablon & Sparling, supra note 278, at 646 n.121 (noting the inconsistencies and stating that
"[a] more accurate couching... depicts El Paso and Adlman as existing on different ends of
the anticipation of litigation spectrum").
312 Searle, 816 F.2d at 399.
3 13
3 14

Id.
Id. at 400-)1.

315 Id.at 401-02.
3 16

Id. at 401.
317 Id. at 400 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947)).
318 Searle, 816 F.2d at 401.
3 19

Id. at 402.
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Because the individual figures "lose their identity" when included in aggregate
amounts, the court held that the work product doctrine did not prevent discovery
of documents that "incorporate a lawyer's thoughts in, at best, such an indirect
and diluted manner." 320 Although the Simon court did allow discovery of the
aggregate reserve documents, one has to question just how much such
documentation could help the opposing attorney's case. Because the documents
would have no indication of the specific case, the only purpose they might have
would be to shed light on how Searle treats cases of a similar kind as a whole.
b. Waiver
Because the work product doctrine prevents disclosure to the opposing party
and counsel, transmission of work product to third parties, including accountants,
may not waive the protection. In fact, courts have split as to whether disclosures
to independent auditors waive the work product protection. 3 21 In addition,
several courts have concluded that communications concerning individual case
reserves qualified for work product protection, while ordering defendants to
322
produce information regarding aggregate reserve figures.
320
321

Id (footnote omitted).
Compare In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 90 Civ. 1260(SS), 1993 WL 561125, at *6

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1993) (concluding that disclosure to independent auditor did not waive
work product protection, but eliminated argument that attorney-client privilege applied), and
Gramm v. Horsehead Indus., Inc., No. 87 CIV. 5122(MJL), 1990 WL 142404, at *4-6
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1990) (concluding that disclosure to an accounting firm which did not work
on matters related to the case did not waive work product rule), with In re Diasonics Sec. Litig.,
No. C-83-4584-RFP(FW), 1986 WL 53402, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 1986) (reasoning at least
in part that although disclosure to someone sharing a common interest under a guarantee of
confidentiality does not necessarily waive the work product protection, an independent
accountant's responsibilities to creditors and the investing public transcend any such
guarantee), and United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681,687 (1st Cir. 1997) (listing
five circuits that have adopted the rule that disclosure to a non-adversary does not waive work
product protection, restating the prevailing rule as "disclosure to an adversary, real or potential,
forfeits work product protection," and treating the disclosure to the Defense Contract Audit

Agency as "disclosure to a potential adversary"). In the Diasonicscase, plaintiffs filed a motion

to compel Arthur Young & Co. to produce documents prepared by or disclosed to Diasonics'
auditor so that the accounting firm could assess how pending litigation, including the
underlying lawsuit, would affect Diasonics' financial condition. The court granted the motion,
finding that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine excused
production because the documents "were generated for the business purpose of creating
financial statements which would satisfy the requirements of the federal securities laws and not
to assist in litigation." In re Diasonics,1986 WL 53402, at *1.
322 See, e.g., Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987) (ruling that risk
management documents prepared by corporate officials to aggregate information from
individual case reserve figures obtained from the company's legal department were not
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2. Limitations on the Scope of Discovery
Given the potential value of this information regarding litigation reserves and
contingencies, plaintiffs should expect that defendants and third parties will seek
to resist discovery requests even when the requested information qualifies as
"relevant" and "not privileged." At a minimum, the recipients of requests will
attempt to narrow the range of requested discovery. Although Rule 26(b)(1)
establishes a very broad scope of discovery, Rule 26(b)(2) gives the trial judge
broad powers to regulate or prevent discovery even though the materials sought
fall within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1). In that regard, Rule 26(b)(2) authorizes a
court to limit the frequency or extent of the use of the discovery methods
otherwise permitted if the court
determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii)
the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties'
resources, the importance of issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance
323
of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.
Courts have historically and freely exercised these powers. 324 As a result, a
litigation opponent or third party may try to quash or otherwise avoid discovery
on several possible grounds: irrelevancy, undue burden or excessive cost,
privilege, or work product.

protected from discovery by the work product doctrine in product liability action against
intrauterine contraceptive device manufacturer); Gen. Electric Capital Corp. v. DirectTV, Inc.,
184 F.R.D. 32, 34-36 (D. Conn. 1998) (drawing a distinction between individual case reserves
and aggregate figures and concluding, after in camera review, that five documents pertaining to
defendants' loss reserves were both relevant and not privileged under either the work product
doctrine or the attorney-client privilege); In re Pfizer, Inc., 1993 WL 561125, at *3-5
(concluding that documents containing individual case reserve figures could qualify for both
work product protection and the attorney-client privilege in class action suit under federal
securities laws).
323 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
324 Although no privilege protects a party's income tax return, "courts have recognized

that interests in privacy may call for ... extra protection." FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory
committee's note to 1970 amendment to subdivision (b).
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C. PotentialAdmissibility
Dictum from at least one court suggests that information about litigation
reserves might even qualify as admissible evidence. In In re Amino Acid Lysine
Antitrust Litigation,325 the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois ordered disclosure of any reserves that defendant Archer-DanielsMidland Co. had established for the underlying antitrust litigation before the
court would rule that the proposed settlement in the class action fell within the
range of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy. The judge wrote:
In this Court's experience in representing public companies, or in separately
representing the outside directors of public companies, it has found such reserves
to be a material indicium of the fair value of a liability, estimated by those who
326
are presumably in the best position to make such an evaluation.
In contrast, some courts have explicitly rejected the argument that a defendant
waives the right to deny liability by accruing an expense or loss on a claim.327 To
the extent that the defendant's accounting policies interpret the term "probable"
to mean at least an eighty percent chance of an unfavorable outcome, 328 the
arguments for admissibility get much stronger. By comparison, if the defendant's
' 329
accounting policies treat "probable" as "anything greater than fifty percent,
the danger of unfair prejudice arguably substantially outweighs the accrual's
330
probative value.

V. CONCLUSION AND REFORM PROPOSAL

By accruing an expense and recording a litigation reserve related to an
underlying lawsuit, undergoing an audit, or providing some bland disclosure in a
public report, this article warns that an enterprise could both waive the right to
claim privilege and lose work product protection for any information disclosed to
its auditor in any litigation involving a federal issue, such as the federal antitrust,
325 No. 95 C 7679, 1996 WL 197671 (N.D. III. Apr. 22, 1996).
326 Id.at *5.
327 See, e.g., Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Beecham, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 1027, 1047 n.12 (D.N.J.
1993) (ruling that an insurer's establishment of a reserve did not constitute an admission in a
policy coverage dispute).
328 See supra note 40.
329
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
330
See FED. R. EvID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.").
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environmental, or securities laws. Thus, via discovery requests and subpoena,
opposing counsel could obtain the enterprise's own documentation regarding
litigation contingencies, plus whatever information an independent auditor might
have incorporated in the working papers or otherwise gathered during the audit,
for use at trial or during settlement negotiations. As a result, an opponent in
litigation can potentially gain access to significant information about the
assessments of an enterprise, its auditor, and its attorney about the enterprise's
exposure in the litigation, potentially evidenced by amounts that the enterprise
has already accrued as an expense, but not yet paid, related to the underlying
litigation.
Given these realities, the legal profession, the business community, including
the accounting profession, and the academy should ask whether any public
policies, including those underlying discovery of all relevant information in
advance of trial, 33 1 "full disclosure" under the federal securities laws, 332 and the
preferred settlement, whenever possible, of lawsuits outside the judicial
system, 333 justify the existence and use of these discovery opportunities. After
weighing those policies and an appropriate study, the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence should recommend that the Supreme Court adopt a
new rule of evidence that, similar to Rule 411 on liability insurance, 334 would
331 See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 FederalDiscovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998). The drafters of
the original discovery rules intended the rules to result in more uniform discovery practices, to
allow greater clarity in defining the contested issues, and to eliminate the element of surprise,
allowing lawyers to better prepare for trial. Id. at 702-10 (citing GEORGE RAGLAND, JR.,
DIscOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 266 (1932)). In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the
Supreme Court recognized that proper litigation requires that parties have access to the
information that can provide them with a "mutual knowledge of all of the relevant facts." l at
507.
332 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
333 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why
Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 257-63 (1999)
(describing various legal rules and policy reasons to encourage settlement of lawsuits). Any
policy discussion should also weigh another consideration: while discoverability of information
about litigation reserves might encourage some cases to settle, it might also encourage litigants
to file actions or claims that they might not otherwise bring in an effort to determine whether an
opponent has recorded a litigation reserve.
334 Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon
the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This nile does not
require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another
purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.

FED. R. EVID. 411.
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allow the discovery of information related to litigation reserves and litigation
contingencies, but would bar its admission into evidence at trial on the issues of
whether the enterprise has admitted liability on the claim or the amount of
liability.
Discovery seeks to provide a mechanism that allows the litigants to obtain all
relevant information. In Hickman v. Taylor,33 5 the landmark case that recognized
the work product doctrine, the Supreme Court stated that "[m]utual knowledge of
336
all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation."
Accordingly, the Federal Rules contemplate a discovery process that facilitates
"a broad search for facts, the names of witnesses, or any other matters [that] may
aid [parties] in the preparation or presentation of [their] case[s]. 3 37
In 1970, the Supreme Court promulgated comprehensive amendments to the
discovery rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 338 As one of the most
significant changes, the 1970 amendments to then-Rule 26(b)(2) allowed parties
to discover the contents of insurance policies. 339 Subsequent amendments in
1993 moved this provision to Rule 26(a)(1)(D) and revised the rule to require
disclosure of the insurance policy itself.340 Before the 1970 amendments, both

judicial decisions and commentators had split on the question of whether parties
could discover insurance policies when the insurance coverage was not
admissible and did not bear on any other issue in the case. 34 1 "The cases favoring
disclosure rel[ied] heavily on the practical significance of insurance in the
decisions that lawyers reach about settlement and trial preparation. '342 The
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules for Civil Procedure, and presumably
the Supreme Court, concluded that "disclosure of insurance coverage [would]
enable counsel for both sides to make the same realistic appraisal of the case, so
that [they could base] settlement and litigation strategy ...on knowledge, not
speculation." 34 3 The Advisory Committee further believed that such disclosure
would sometimes advance settlement and avoid protracted litigation. 34 4 At the
same time, the Advisory Committee stressed that "[i]n no instance does
335 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

336 Idat 507.
337 FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's notes to 1946 amendment to subdivision (b).
338 FED. R. Civ. P. pt. V. advisory committee's explanatory statement concerning 1970
amendments to discovery rules (section on "Depositions and Discovery").
339
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's notes to 1970 amendment.
340 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(D) and advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment.
341 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's notes to 1970 amendment.
342 Id.
343 Id
344 Id
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disclosure make the facts concerning insurance coverage admissible in
345
evidence."
In its explanation of the 1970 amendments, the Advisory Committee
deliberately limited the new rule to insurance coverage. In that regard, the
Advisory Committee stated that the new rule does not apply to a business
concern that creates a reserve fund for purposes of self-insurance. 34 6 When
establishing a litigation reserve, enterprises only rarely, if ever, also set funds
aside to satisfy the underlying liability. 347 As a result, the exception to the rule
requiring disclosure of insurance policies for reserve funds does not apply to
34 8
litigation reserves.
The Advisory Committee also specifically stated that the new rule did not
apply to any other facts concerning the defendant's financial status for several
reasons. First, the Advisory Committee considered insurance as an asset, albeit
not in the financial accounting sense, created specifically to satisfy the claim.
Second, the insurance company ordinarily controls the litigation. Third, a litigant
can obtain information about coverage only from the defendant or the insurer.
Finally, disclosure about insurance does not involve a significant invasion of
privacy.
These same justifications also support the discovery of litigation reserves.
First, under SFAS No. 5 any accrual or disclosure related to a litigation
345

Id.

346 Id

347 See supra note 4.
348
Ifan enterprise has actually both set aside cash or other liquid assets by establishing a
formal escrow arrangement or opening a special bank account and specifically earmarked those
assets for discharging obligations arising from particular litigation, such designation arguably
comes extremely close to admitting liability in the underlying lawsuit. Such a situation could
eventually lead to either an admission under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
admissible evidence as either an admission by a party-opponent, or so-called "declaration
against interest," specifically excluded from the definition of hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(A)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, or an exception to the hearsay rule as a statement against
interest under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. An alternative interpretation
would allow the opponent in litigation to discover only information regarding the litigation
reserve and any related expense.
A "declaration against interest" includes both verbal statements and non-verbal actions.
Such statements generally qualify without regard to surrounding circumstances. CHRISTOPHER
B. MUEU.ER & LAIRD C. KRKPATICK, EVIDENCE § 8.27, at 865 (2d ed. 1999). Consequently,

the declaration against interest rule has "almost infinite breadth." Id at 866 (citation omitted).
In addition, Rule 801(dX2XA) does not require that the declaration be against interest when it
was made. Id A finding that a statement or behavior falls under the "declaration against
interest" rule, however, does not automatically require its admissibility. Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, for example, allows exclusion of an admission if, among other risks, the
risk of unfair prejudice outweighs the statement's probative value. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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contingency must involve at least one particular clainTh 349 Second, accounting
practice has long placed the responsibility for an enterprise's financial statements
on management. 350 As a result, the enterprise's management decides in the first
instance whether to accrue an expense related to a litigation contingency or to
disclose that contingency in the notes to the financial statements. Although an
auditor may refuse to render an unqualified opinion on the financial statements
unless management records an adjustment or adds certain disclosures, the
financial statements remain the representations of management. 35 1 Third, a party
can generally obtain information about an opponent's litigation reserves only
from the enterprise or the enterprise's auditor.352 Finally, especially for
registrants that must file financial statements and periodic reports with the SEC,
353
disclosure during discovery does not involve a significant invasion of privacy.
At the same time, any disclosure in discovery, at least by itself, should not
become admissible in evidence or constitute a waiver of the enterprise's defenses
or litigating position.

34 9

See supranotes 49-58 and accompanying text.

350 HERwrrz & BARREnt, supra note *, at 173.
351 Id.

352 If the enterprise's management discusses a litigation reserve or litigation contingency
with a financial analyst or investment banker, or provides documentation regarding such
matters to such individuals, the litigation opponent could potentially discover those
communications from those individuals. Any such disclosures, however, would seemingly
waive any privileges and significantly weaken any claims to work product protection.
353

At some point, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may

want to consider an amendment to those rules to require parties to disclose any litigation
reserves related to an underlying lawsuit under Rule 26(aX1). Because such a rule would apply
to all parties, including enterprises not subject to the SEC's periodic reporting requirements,
such an amendment to Rule 26(a)(1) also raises privacy concerns.

